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I. INTRODUCTION
Writing the annual review of Supreme Court employment law
decisions for Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal is not
an easy task. First, it is certainly hard to follow the quality work
produced by those that have enjoyed this task before me. In re-
reading the prior reviews in preparation to write this article, I was
struck by the quality of the analysis and the many insights that the
prior reviewers provided. Second, it is not an overstatement to
suggest that each analysis of the decisions issued by Supreme Court in
the 2001-02 term could be turned into a separate law review article.
Finally, this was a busy term for the Supreme Court in the
employment area. Eighteen of the seventy-five cases decided by the
Court (24 percent), involved employment law issues. These eighteen
cases are almost double the number of employment law cases decided
during the last two terms.
Facing this somewhat daunting task, I have opted for a bit of
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simplicity. Instead of trying to provide a detailed analysis of each
case, a task for which I feel unprepared and which, undoubtedly,
others will take on over the course of the next few years, I set two
simple objectives for the article. First, the article will summarize each
of the cases. My intent is to provide those unfamiliar with the cases a
brief review of the facts and a summary of the Court's reasoning.
Parts II through VI provide this discussion, grouping the cases by
subject area.
Second, in Part VII, the article provides a "big picture" analysis
of the various cases. My intent is to identify trends, issues, interesting
aspects and features of the Court's term. My objective is to aid in our
understanding of the patterns that might affect the Court's treatment
of future employment law cases.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Employment discrimination continues to be the employment law
area drawing the most attention from the Supreme Court. In the
2001-02 term, the Court decided seven cases involving employment
discrimination.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
I. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,'
petitioner, Ella Williams claimed that Toyota Manufacturing violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 2 by failing to provide her
with a reasonable accommodation. Shortly after beginning work at
Toyota's engine fabrication assembly line, Williams developed carpal
tunnel syndrome.3 Her doctor issued permanent work restrictions,
which included avoidance of repetitive use of her hands and arms and
use of vibratory tools.' Williams continued to work at the plant
during the next five years, performing a variety of jobs.' She was
physically capable of performing the assigned job, and her
performance, by all accounts, was satisfactory.
1. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12191-12213 (2000).
3. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
4. Id. at 187-88.
5. Id. at 188-89.
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In 1996, the employer announced that the employees performing
the job to which Williams was assigned were to rotate through all four
processes related to that job. The new assignments required Williams
to hold her hands and arms up around shoulder height for several
hours at a time. Soon after beginning the new tasks, Williams began
to experience pain in her neck and shoulders. After consulting with
Toyota's in-house medical service, Williams requested that Toyota
accommodate her medical condition by allowing her to only perform
the two tasks in her job that did not require her to hold her arms and
hands up for several hours.6
Accounts conflicted as to what occurred next. Williams argued
that Toyota refused her request and forced her to continue
performing all the tasks associated with her job. Toyota argued that
Williams simply began to miss work on a regular basis. It was
undisputed, however, that before Williams was terminated, she had
been placed under a "no-work-of-any-kind" restriction by her
treating physicians.
Williams filed suit against Toyota alleging that the company
violated the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate her
disability. Williams claimed that her physical impairment substantially
limited her in: (1) performance of manual tasks; (2) housework; (3)
gardening; (4) playing with her children; (5) lifting; and (6) working.
Williams also claimed that she was disabled under the ADA because
she was regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment and
she had a record of such impairment.'
The district court found that Williams was not disabled because
she was not substantially limited in any major life activity; thus, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of Toyota.9 Williams
appealed with respect to all of the activities except playing with
children, gardening, and housework. The Sixth Circuit reversed and
found that Williams was disabled since she could not "perform
repetitive work with her hands or arms extended at or above shoulder
level for extended periods of time."o The Sixth Circuit held that
Williams merely had to demonstrate that she was substantially limited
in a class of manual activities that affected her ability to perform at
6. Id. at 189.
7. Id. at 190.
8. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B), (C) (2000).
9. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
10. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th. Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534
U.S 184 (2002).
THE SUPREME COURTS 2001-02 TERM
work to prove her disability."
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sixth Circuit
applied an incorrect standard in determining whether Williams was
disabled. The Court stated that to determine if a person is
substantially limited in the performance of manual tasks the
impairments must "prevent or restrict the plaintiff from performing
tasks that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." 2
The Court reached this conclusion by evaluating Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare Rehabilitation Act regulations, as
well as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
regulations. Under the EEOC regulations, the term "substantially
limited" is defined as, among other things, "unable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population
can perform."1 3 Citing Webster's Dictionary, the Court concluded that
the term "major" in the context of "major life activity" means
important. 4 The Court also concluded that "manual tasks unique to
any particular job are not necessarily important parts of most people's
lives."'" Under this standard, Williams was not disabled because the
performance of repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or
above shoulder level for extended periods of time was not a task of
central importance to most people's daily lives."6
The Court's decision raises a number of interesting questions. In
Toyota, the Court confirmed that the analysis under the ADA is an
individual case-by-case approach." Employers will not know for
quite some time, until enough case law is developed, whether a
specific impairment will satisfy the "disability" requirements of the
ADA. This is likely to generate a substantial amount of apprehension
in the business community.
To illustrate this point, one need go no further than the Court's
treatment of the very impairment involved in Toyota - carpal tunnel
syndrome. The Court made clear that individuals with carpal tunnel
syndrome are not barred from bringing ADA claims." The Court
pointed out that the syndrome has a number of different levels of
11. Id.
12. Toyota, 534 U. S. at 198.
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001).
14. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195.
15. Id. at 201.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 198-99.
18. Id. at 199.
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severity, indicating that in some situations the condition could
amount to a disability under the ADA.'9
By making it clear that the question whether an impairment
constitutes a disability must be answered by analyzing not only the
effect of the impairment in the workplace, but also the effect of the
impairment in activities outside of the workplace, the Court's decision
may have two unintended and perverse consequences. First, looking
at the effect of the impairment on activities outside the workplace
appears to make it more difficult for employers to determine whether
an employee is covered by the ADA.20 For example, consider an
employee who suffers from an impairment, but who has managed,
despite severe pain, to perform her job duties while at work.
However, at home, the employee is totally unable to perform some
basic activities. To find out whether the individual satisfies the
ADA's definition of disability, the employer will have to inquire in
much more detail about the employee's private life. This leads to the
second perverse consequence. Employees will be put in a position of
having to share more details of their personal lives with their
employers. It is hard to imagine that the more liberal members of the
Court intended this result when they joined the unanimous Toyota
decision.
2. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,21 the Court considered the
validity of an EEOC regulation allowing employers to refuse to hire a
disabled individual whose performance on the job would present a
"direct threat" to that individual's own health. The plaintiff, Mario
Echazabal, began working for contractors doing business with
Chevron at one of Chevron's refineries in 1972.22 Over the next
twenty-four years, Echazabal twice applied for a job with Chevron.
In both instances, Chevron offered to hire Echazabal contingent on
his passing a physical examination. Echazabal failed the examinations
both times. The doctors found a liver condition, which they said
would be aggravated by exposure to chemicals at the refinery.
Ultimately, Chevron rescinded the job offer and directed the
19. Id.
20. See Jonathan R. Mook, Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of ADA, but Uncertainties
Remain, 2 BENDER'S LAB. & EMPLOY. BULL. 75 (2002).
21. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
22. Id. at 2047.
THE SUPREME COURTS 2001-02 TERM
contractor to reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to harmful
chemicals or to remove him from the refinery altogether.23
Following his termination, Echazabal filed suit claiming that
Chevron violated the ADA. Chevron defended its decision under an
EEOC regulation permitting the defense that a worker's disability on
the job would pose a "direct threat" to his health.24 The district court
granted summary judgment for Chevron, but the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 25 According to the Ninth Circuit, the
EEOC's "direct threat" regulation exceeded the scope of permissible
rulemaking. The court reasoned that the ADA explicitly recognizes
an employer's right to adopt an employment qualification barring
anyone whose disability would place others in the workplace at risk,
while saying nothing about threats to the disabled employee himself
or herself. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "by specifying only
threats to 'other individuals in the workplace,' the ADA makes clear
that the 'direct threat' defense does not apply to threats to a disabled
employee's own health and safety."26
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Souter, reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court first looked at the
statutory language, recognizing that the ADA allows an employer to
raise an affirmative defense where the employer acted under a
qualification standard that is "shown to be job-related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity." 27  The Court
noted that the statute goes on to state that such a qualification
standard "may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace." 28 Finally, the Court noted that the EEOC, by regulation,
had carried the defense one step further in allowing an employer to
screen out a potential employee with a disability for risks on the job
to the employee's own health or safety.29
The Court's opinion can be divided into two parts. In the first
part, the Court responded to the plaintiff's argument that because the
23. Id. at 2047-48.
24. Id. at 2048. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001) ("The term 'qualification standard'
may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of the individual or others in the workplace.").
25. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
26. Id. at 1066-67.
27. 122 S. Ct. at 20 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000)).
28. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2000)).
29. Id. at 2049 (quoting 29 § C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001)).
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statute referred only to the health and safety of others, an employee's
threat to self was not implicated.3 0 The Court gave three reasons for
rejecting the plaintiff's argument. First, the Court noted, the
statutory language itself did not establish its exclusiveness. The
harm-to-others provision was better understood as an example of
legitimate qualifications. The "may include" language in the statute
supported this contention.3 1 Also missing from the statute, said the
Court, was "that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-
exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission
bespeaks a negative implication."32
Second, the plaintiff failed to identify any series of terms that
included both threats to others and threats to self to support the
position that Congress chose to include one but not the other." The
plaintiff argued that Congress, in adopting the threat-to-others
formulation in the ADA, expressly omitted the threat-to-self
regulatory language of the EEOC's Rehabilitation Act regulations,
which like those of the ADA extended the affirmative defense to
qualifications addressing employees' threat to self.3 4  The Court
rejected this argument, noting that because the EEOC was only one
of many agencies interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, its regulations
"did not establish a clear, standard pairing of threats to self and
others," so as to present Congress with an unequivocal combination
on which to premise a negative inference.35 Finally, the Court noted
that the plaintiff's interpretation was problematic because it provided
no "stopping point to the argument that by specifying a threat-to-
others defense Congress intended a negative implication about those
whose safety could be considered."
In the second, and I submit more significant, part of the opinion,
the Court discussed the validity of the EEOC regulations and the
response to the "paternalism" argument made by the plaintiff.
Applying the principles of judicial deference as established in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,3 the
30. Id. at 2049-50.




35. Id. at 2051; see also EEOC's View of 'Direct Threat' Defense Upheld as Reasonable
Interpretation of ADA, 70 U.S.L.W. 1742 (June 11, 2002).
36. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2051.
37. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
THE SUPREME COURTS 2001-02 TERM
Echazabal Court found the EEOC regulation to be a reasonable
interpretation of the ADA. The EEOC's interpretation was
reasonable, since it was likely to reduce time lost to sickness,
excessive turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under
state tort law, and the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.38
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
regulation was unreasonable because it was based on the kind of
workplace paternalism the ADA was meant to outlaw.39 The Court
recognized that the ADA protects disabled individuals from the
paternalistic reasons that led employers to deny them employment
opportunities. However, the Court disagreed with the plaintiff to the
extent that such a concern on the part of Congress could be
interpreted to require employers to "place disabled workers at a
specifically demonstrated risk."40  Instead, the Court noted, in
enacting the ADA Congress "was trying to get at refusals to give an
even break to classes of disabled people, while claiming to act for
their own good in reliance on untested and pretextual stereotypes.' 41
The Court noted that the regulation in question was directed
exactly towards this concern. The regulation requires that the direct
threat defense be "based on a reasonable medical judgment that
relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best
available objective evidence, and upon an expressly 'individualized
assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the
essential functions of the job."'42 To provide a context to its decision,
the Court distinguished two earlier cases that raised similar issues,
albeit under different statutes: Dothard v. Rawlinson,43 and
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.44 According to the
Court, those two cases "were concerned with paternalistic judgments
based on the broad category of gender, while the EEOC has required
that judgments based on the direct threat provision be made on the
basis of individualized risk assessments." 45
While a defeat for the employee, the Echazabal decision is not
38. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
39. Id. at 2052-53.
40. Id. at 2052.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2053 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2001)).
43, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
44. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
45. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5.
2002] 197
198 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol.6:189
necessarily anti-plaintiff. First, the case may have narrow implications
because of its facts. It is hard to imagine that there will be many cases
in which employees will seek employment in jobs they know will
place them at a health and safety risk. Similarly, it is also unlikely
that there will be many cases in which an individual is a threat to self
but not to others.4 6
Second, while the Court found against the plaintiff, the Court
also provided a strong endorsement of the EEOC's ADA regulations.
The Court noted that since Congress had not spoken "exhaustively on
threats to a worker's own health," the agency's regulation will be
given deference "so long as it makes sense of the statutory"
language. 47 As discussed above, the Court found the regulations to be
reasonable for "unsurprising" reasons.48 One of these reasons was the
employer's concern that hiring an individual who might be a threat to
him or herself could amount to a violation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970.49 In responding to the plaintiff's argument
that this reason was not legitimate, the Court commented on the role
of an agency facing a potential conflict between two statutes. The
Court noted, "Courts would, of course, resolve the tensions if there
were no agency action, but the EEOC's resolution exemplifies the
substantive choices that agencies are expected to make when
Congress leaves the intersection of competing objectives both
imprecisely marked but subject to the administrative leeway found in
[the ADA].` 0
Whether the case in its narrower point turns out to be pro- or
anti-plaintiff depends in part on how lower courts interpret the
EEOC's regulation. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit to consider whether Chevron's decision to exclude Echazabal
from the workplace was an "individualized medical inquiry required
by the regulation."" Thus, unanswered are such questions as: What
showing is required to establish a threat to self; is this assessment
evaluated based on the information available when the decision was
made or at the time of litigation; and who decides where experts
disagree - the judge or the jury?
46. See Jonathan R. Mook, Supreme Court Rules that Disabled Workers Have no Right to
Endanger Themselves, 2 BENDER'S LAB. & EMP. BULL. 363, 367 (2002).
47. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2051-52.
48. Id. at 2952.
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000).
50. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
51. Id. at 2047.
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3. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,2 the Supreme Court settled a long
running dispute over the interplay between seniority systems and the
ADA. The uncertainty of the relationship between the ADA and
seniority systems stemmed largely from the Supreme Court's decision
in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison." In that case, the Court
held that "in the context of Title VII religious discrimination an
employer need not adapt to an employee's special worship schedule
as a 'reasonable accommodation' where doing so would conflict with
the seniority rights of other employees. "54
Under the ADA, employers must make reasonable
accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual with a known
physical or mental disability, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship." Seniority
provisions often allow employees to transfer to vacant, better-quality
positions. The ADA, however, lists "reassignment to a vacant
position" as one example of a reasonable accommodation." Several
lower courts interpreted the Trans World Airlines case to mean that
seniority systems under collective bargaining agreements trump the
ADA.
In a 5-4 decision the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Breyer, held that there is a rebuttable presumption that an
accommodation that conflicts with a seniority system is unreasonable;
however, the presumption may be overcome if the employee presents
evidence of special circumstances that make an exception to a
seniority rule reasonable in a particular case." The plaintiff has the
burden of proving the special circumstances that make departure
from a seniority system reasonable, while the employer need only
present evidence that a seniority system exists.
52. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
53. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
54. US Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1524 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79-80).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
56. Id. § 12111(9)(b).
57. See David v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (accomdation
of no overtime work or selective overtime violated collective bargaining agreement and thus
was not required by ADA); Feliciano v. State of Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780 (1st Cir.
1998)(employer's failure to accommodate employee's disability by atuomatically reassigning
employee to a position in violation of right of person who received the position under process
outlined in collective bargaining agreement does not violate ADA).
58. US Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
59. Id. at 1524.
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The US Airways case arose when Robert Barnett injured his
back while working in the cargo department for the petitioner US
Airways.60 After his injury, Barnett used U.S. Airways' seniority
system to transfer to a less demanding position in the mailroom.61
Two years later, Barnett learned that US Airways intended to open
his position to enable a more senior employee to displace him.
Barnett asked US Airways to make an exception to the seniority
policy to allow him to keep his position, but US Airways refused.
Barnett brought suit against his employer claiming that US Airways
discriminated against him by denying him a reasonable
accommodation.62
US Airways argued that the ADA only required equal treatment
of disabled individuals with non-disabled individuals and that
allowing the ADA to trump a seniority system could create a
preference for persons with disabilities. 63 The Court, however, noted
that the ADA "[r]equires preferences in the form of reasonable
accommodations that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain
the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities
automatically enjoy." 64
The majority also offered guidelines for employees bringing such
claims. For instance, the majority stated that the employee can
overcome the seniority system presumption by demonstrating (1) that
the employer, having retained the right to change the seniority system
unilaterally, changes the system so often that employees' expectations
that the system will be followed are reduced, or (2) that the system
contains so many exceptions that one more exception for individuals
with disabilities will not matter.
Justice O'Connor concurred, although she disagreed with the
majority's method for determining whether reassignment to a vacant
position which violates a seniority system is an unreasonable
60. Id. at 1519.
61. Id. US Airways seniority policy was part of a unilaterally adopted system, as opposed
to a collectively bargained agreement. The policy stated that "the Agent Personnel Policy
Guide is not intended to be a contract (express or implied) or otherwise to create legally
enforceable obligation for continued employment on the part of either US Air or its
employee.... US Air reserves the right to change any and all of the stated policies and
procedures at any time, without advance notice." See Respondent's Brief at 2, US Airways v.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
62. US Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1519.
63. Id. at 1520.
64. Id. at 1521.
65. Id. at 1525.
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accommodation.66 Justice O'Connor believed the issue of whether the
ADA trumps a seniority system turns on whether the seniority system
is legally enforceable.6 ' According to Justice O'Connor, in a legally
enforceable seniority system, a position does not become vacant if the
seniority system entitles another employee to it; however, if an
employer has an unenforceable policy the position would be vacant,
because the employee expecting assignment under the seniority
system would not have a contractual right to the position. Justice
O'Connor cited legislative history to emphasize the requirement that
the position be vacant.68
In one of two dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, opined that seniority systems always trump the reasonable
accommodation provision of the ADA.69 According to Justice Scalia,
the ADA requires employers to "modify or remove" barriers that
burden a disabled individual.0 However, the ADA does not require
modification of policies and practices that apply equally to all
employees. For example, Justice Scalia noted, the ADA does not
require an employer to pay a disabled employee more money."
Justice Scalia also took issue with the majority's rationale that when
employers make exceptions to seniority systems, one more exception
"will not likely make a difference."72 He reasoned that "[e]ven when
seniority systems contain exceptions, employees expect these to be
the only exceptions. ,73
A second dissenting opinion was written by Justice Souter.
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that a reassignment to a vacant position will
most likely be unreasonable when it violates the terms of a seniority
system.74 Justice Souter pointed out that unlike Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, nothing in the ADA insulates
seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation requirement.
66. Id. at 1526-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1527.
68. "The Committee also wishes to make clear that reassignment need only be to a vacant
position - 'bumping' another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required." Id.
(quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at. 32 (1989)).
69. Id. at 1528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id at 1529.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1531.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1532 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
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Justice Souter also referred to the legislative history of the ADA
which contained various references explaining that seniority
protections contained in collective bargaining agreements were only
"a factor" in deciding the reasonableness of the accommodation.
According to Justice Souter, it was significant that Congress, knowing
full well of the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements, still
gave those agreements no more weight than any other factor in
making the reasonableness determination.76 Thus, it must be the case,
argued Souter, that seniority provisions unilaterally imposed by the
employer could not be given greater weight than those negotiated in a
collective bargaining agreement."
Unlike the other two ADA decisions in the 2001-02 term, the
decision in US Airways reveals a very divided court. Not only was
this a 5-4 decision, but the two concurring opinions make it clear that
the Court is far from resolving this issue.
In addition to addressing the interplay between seniority systems
and the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement, the Court's
decision is significant in at least two respects. First, it appears that
seven Justices agreed with Justice Breyer's dismissal of the
employer's argument that the ADA does not require preferences but
instead demands only equal treatment of the disabled and non-
disabled. This argument had been adopted by some lower courts in
support of the conclusion that there is no "affirmative action"
requirement in the ADA. 8 Justice Breyer rejected the argument,
stating that the ADA clearly envisioned that the reasonable
accommodation language would, in some situations, require "the
employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e.,
preferentially."7 9
Second, in what may prove to be a problem for future plaintiffs,
the Court included some interesting language distinguishing between
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Justice Breyer
noted that the ADA referred to an "undue hardship on the operation
of the business." 0 Accordingly, Justice Breyer pointed out, an
accommodation "could prove unreasonable because of its impact, not
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Fossell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("nor, for
that matter, does the ADA require 'affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities...
79. Id. at 1521.
80. Id. at 1522 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000)).
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on business operations, but on fellow employees - say because it will
lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee benefits
to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of
the business itself, may be relatively indifferent."' This distinction
appears to suggest that plaintiffs will have to establish that an
accommodation is not only reasonable in terms of its direct effect on
the employer, but also in terms of its effects on other employees.
The Court's distinction between reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship has implications regarding the burden of proof in
ADA cases. The Court discussed with approval the "practical way"
in which various lower courts had allocated the burden of proof in
ADA cases. According to Justice Breyer, a plaintiff, to survive a
summary judgment motion, need "only show that an
'accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in
the run of cases."82 The defendant then needs to show "specially
(typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue
hardship in the particular circumstances.""'
The US Airways decision leaves unanswered a number of
important questions. For example, although the Court recognized the
importance of seniority systems and established a presumption in
their favor, the Court also made clear that plaintiffs can overcome
this presumption. Indeed, the Court provided plaintiffs with a couple
of scenarios where the presence of a seniority system will not truncate
the accommodation requirement of the ADA. The Court noted that
where the employer has not consistently applied the seniority system,
or where one more exception is unlikely to matter given the other
exceptions already applicable to the seniority system, the plaintiff
may be able to establish that an exception to the seniority system
qualifies as a reasonable accommodation." As Justice Scalia pointed
out in his dissenting opinion, it is hard to know "what this means.""
Similarly, it is unclear how the rebuttable presumption will apply
to different kinds of seniority provisions, in particular those
unilaterally imposed by the employer and those negotiated as part of
a collective bargaining agreement. Both the concurring opinion by
Justice O'Connor and the dissent by Justice Souter noted the possible
81. Id. at 1522.
82. Id. at 1523.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1525.
85. Id. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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implications of this distinction.
Finally, the Court did not provide any guidance for cases
involving seniority systems that also include ability as a factor. It is
fairly common for seniority provisions, at least those negotiated as
part of collective bargaining agreements, to include provisions
allowing the employer to consider seniority and ability in making
personnel decisions.8 6 How will the U.S. Airways presumption apply
in those cases? Potentially, where ability can be factored in, ability
may truncate seniority in every possible occasion. Is the US. Airways
presumption weakened in such cases?
B. Title VII
1. Edelman v. Lynchburg College
Section 706(e)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII"), requires a complainant to file a charge with the EEOC
within 180 days from the time of the alleged unlawful employment
practice, or within 300 days if the charging party institutes
proceedings with a state or local agency." Section 706(b) requires the
complainant to verify a charge, such that the charge is "in writing
under oath or affirmation . .."" The issue before the Supreme Court
in Edelman v. Lynchburg College89 was the "validity of an EEOC
regulation permitting an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after
the time for filing has expired.""o
In Edelman, the plaintiff, Leonard Edelman, was a professor at
Lynchburg College ("Lynchburg"), which denied him tenure on June
6, 1997." On November 14, 1997, Edelman faxed a letter to the
EEOC claiming discrimination on the basis of gender, national origin,
and religion, but Edelman did not verify the fax through an oath or
affirmation.9 2 On November 26, 1997, Edelman's lawyer requested an
interview with an EEOC investigator and stated his understanding
that the interview would not compromise the filing date of November
86. See City of Fond Du Lac, 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) $[ 8520 (1969) (Robert
Moberly, Arb.) (discussing seniority systems that allow for consideration of ability and
qualifications).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
88. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
89. 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002).
90. Id. at 1147.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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14, 1997.93 An EEOC employee replied to Edelman that he should
arrange an interview, and reminded Edelman that a charge must be
filed within the requisite time period, which, in Edelman's case, was
300 days.94 After the interview, the EEOC sent a Form 5 Charge of
Discrimination to Edelman that he was to verify. 95 The EEOC
received the verified Form 5 on April 15, 1998, which was 313 days
after Lynchburg had denied tenure to Edelman.96 The EEOC
forwarded the Form 5 to Lynchburg, and issued a right to sue letter to
Edelman.9 7
Edelman sued Lynchburg under state law and under Title VII."
Lynchburg moved to dismiss, claiming that Edelman's failure to
verify the charge within the 300-day period was a bar to subject
matter jurisdiction.99 Edelman claimed that the appropriate filing
date was November 14, 1997, and pursuant to an EEOC regulation,'0
his subsequent "verification on the Form 5 related back to the
letter. " or
The district court dismissed the Title VII complaint and
remanded the state law claims, finding that the November 14 letter
was not a "charge," since "neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it
as one." 0 2 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that reading sections
706(b) and 706(e)(1) together, "[b]ecause a charge requires
verification..., and because a charge must be filed within the
limitations period,... it follows that a charge must be verified."'
0 3
Thus, "the plain language of [Title VII] foreclosed the EEOC
regulation allowing a later oath to relate back to an earlier charge." 104
The Supreme Court reversed, holding "the EEOC's relation-






98. Id. at 1148.
99. Id.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2001).
101. Edelman, 122 S. Ct. at 1148.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting 228 F.3d 503, 508 (4th Cir. 2000)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1152. The Court also remanded to determine whether Edelman's November 14
letter was a "charge." Because the EEOC failed to notify Lynchburg within 10 days of receiving
the November 14 letter, "the significance of the delayed notice ... would be open on remand."
Id. at 1153.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Souter proffered several reasons for
upholding the relation-back regulation. First, the Court disagreed
with the Fourth Circuit's approach that read sections 706(b) and
706(e)(1) together, because the two provisions have "quite different
objectives.'l06 The objective of the time limitation in section
706(e)(1) "is to encourage a potential charging party to raise a
discrimination claim before it gets stale. 107 On the other hand, the
objective of the verification requirement in section 706(b) is to
"protect ... employers from the disruption and expense of
responding to a claim unless a complainant is serious enough and sure
enough to support it by oath subject to liability for perjury."108
Therefore, the Court found that a "charge" does not necessarily
require an oath.o
Second, the Court upheld the relation-back regulation because it
"not only [was] a reasonable one, but the position [the Court] would
adopt even if there were no formal rule and [the Court was]
interpreting the statute from scratch."1 o Thus, the Court refused to
discuss the appropriate degree of deference to give to the regulation,
because no deference was necessary."
Third, the Court upheld the regulation because it was consistent
with the policy of Title VII, which is to have laypersons initiate the
process. 112 The relation-back provision prevents a layperson from
forfeiting his or her rights, because a layperson might not know that a
charge must be verified.H3 Furthermore, the employer's interests
remain protected because it need not respond until the complainant
supplies verification.11 4
Fourth, the Court upheld the relation-back regulation because it
was consistent with its decision in Becker v. Montgomery,"' which
allowed for a later cure of a signature defect on a notice of appeal.
The Court stated, "There is no reason to think that the relation back
of the oath here is any less reasonable than the relation back of the




110. Id. at 1150.
111. Id. at 1150 n.8.
112. Id. at 1150.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 532 U.S. 757 (2001).
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signature in Becker."
Finally, the Court upheld the regulation because it was consistent
with legislative history. In other contexts, the legislative history
showed approval of "accepting later verification as reaching back to
an earlier, unverified filing.""' In addition, Congress had often
amended Title VII, but never cast doubt on the relation-back
regulation."'9 Therefore, the Court upheld the EEOC's interpretation
of section 706 in the relation-back regulation. 20
Justice O'Connor concurred, opining that the EEOC did not
"adopt the most natural interpretation of Title VII's provisions," but
that the regulation should still be upheld out of deference to the
agency.' 2' Justice O'Connor believed that the best, but not the only,
reading of Title VII required a charge to be "made under oath or
affirmation within the specified time," because sections 706(b) and
706(e)(1) were both subsections of the same section and should be
read together.1 22 Yet Justice O'Connor still found the regulation to be
"reasonable" because it protected laypeople and was consistent with
common law practice.1 23  Justice O'Connor concluded that the
regulation was entitled to Chevron deference. 24
The majority's decision provides much needed uniformity for
statutory filing periods in employment discrimination cases. Eric
Schnapper, a University of Washington law professor who
represented Edelman before the Supreme Court, said that the
relation-back rule created a "real practical problem" that "needed to
be sorted out. ,125 In addition, Schnapper believed the decision was "a
signal to lower courts not to be creating barriers to Title VII
charges. "126
As in Toyota and Echazabal, the case illustrates the tension in
the Court regarding deference to agency action. Justice Souter
referred to the deference issue as an "insignificant issue in this
116. Edelman, 122 S. Ct. at 1151.
117. Id. at 1151-52.
118. Id. at 1152 n.12.
119. Id. at 1152.
120. Id.
121. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 1154.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1154-55.
125. See Fawn H. Johnson, EEOC: Supreme Court Sustains EEOC Rule Allowing Late
Charges to 'Relate Back,' DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 20, 2002, at AA-3.
126. Id.
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case."l 27 He went on to say that the EEOC rule was not only
reasonable, "but the position we would adopt even if there were no
formal rule and we were interpreting the statute from scratch."12
Accordingly, concluded Justice Souter, "there is no occasion to defer
and no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much. "129
Whether the comments by Justice Souter could be interpreted as a
more deferential standard of review is not clear. It is clear, however,
that the justices continue to wrestle with the deference issue if not in
principle, certainly in application.
The concurring opinions by Justice Thomas and Justice
O'Connor addressed this issue. Justice Thomas read the majority
opinion as saying that since the EEOC had clear authority to issue a
procedural regulation, and the regulation was not proscribed by the
statute and in conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Court should uphold the agency rule.'
Justice O'Connor's concern with agency authority was more
evident, as she made it clear that the EEOC interpretation of the
statute regarding the filing requirements was not "the most natural
interpretation."1 3' Ultimately she concurred with the majority, but
under a more limited rationale. Echoing Justice Thomas, Justice
O'Connor focused on the procedural nature of the rule, and on the
statute's ambiguity.
2. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan
Under Title VII, a plaintiff "shall" file an employment
discrimination charge with the EEOC either 180 or 300 days after an
"alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 3 2 In National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,33 the Court confronted the
interpretation of this statutory language where an employee alleged
that the employer had engaged in a number of specific discriminatory
acts (e.g., hiring him as an electrician helper instead of as an
electrician, and refusing to allow him to participate in a training
program),134 and "consistently harassed" him on account of his race."'
127. Edelman, 122 S. Ct. at 1150.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1153 (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(i) (2000).
133. 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
134. Id. at 2068 & n.1.
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The Court held that Title VII precludes recovery for discrete acts of
discrimination or retaliation that occur outside of the statutory
period, but that consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work
environment claim is appropriate even if some of the events fall
outside the 180- or 300-day statutory period.136
The plaintiff in National Railroad Passenger Corp. had been
hired as an electrician helper at Amtrak's Oakland Maintenance
Yard. Over the course of the next five years, the plaintiff had
numerous run-ins with management which he characterized as
racially motivated. After his termination, the plaintiff filed his EEOC
charge and later commenced a lawsuit alleging race discrimination,
racial harassment and retaliation under Title VII. The trial court
granted summary judgment in part to Amtrak. According to the trial
court, the company could not be held liable for conduct occurring
outside the 300-day filing period.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed on the basis of its interpretation of
the continuing violation doctrine, which "allows courts to consider
conduct that would ordinarily be time barred 'as long as the untimely
incidents represent an ongoing unlawful employment practice.'""'
According to the Ninth Circuit, under the continuing violation
doctrine, the plaintiff would succeed in his claim if he could
demonstrate either "a series of related acts one or more of which are
within the limitations period," or "a systematic policy or practice of
discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period."13 1
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently demonstrated
a genuine issue of fact as to whether a continuing violation existed.'40
However, because the district court did not allow events occurring in
the pre-limitations period to be presented to the jury for purposes of
liability, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case and ordered a new
trial. 4 1
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, noted that
in cases involving the timely filing requirement of Title VII, the Court
had followed a "strict adherence" to the statutory requirements,
since doing so had been "the best guarantee of evenhanded
135. Id. at 2068.
136. Id. at 2077.
137. Id. at 2068-69.
138. Id. at 2069 (quoting 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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administration of the law. "142 Justice Thomas began his analysis by
looking at the statutory language. Under Section 2000e-5(e)(1), a
charge "shall be filed within" 180 or 300 days "after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred."1 43  According to Justice
Thomas, the critical questions under this section are: "What
constitutes an "unlawful employment practice" and when has that
practice occurred. The majority's opinion embarked to answer both
of these questions with respect to "discrete discriminatory acts" and
"hostile work environment claims."144
With regard to discrete acts, the Court unanimously rejected the
plaintiff's arguments that since the statute requires filing of a charge
within the specified number of days after an "unlawful employment
practice," and since the word "practice" connoted an ongoing
violation that can last over a period of time, discriminatory events
that occurred outside the statutory periods ought to be considered in
assessing employer liability under Title VII.145 The Court advanced a
number of arguments. First, the Court noted, in explaining the sorts
of actions that qualify as unlawful employment practices, the statute
includes numerous discrete acts. 46 Second, the Court had in the past
interpreted the term "practice" to apply to a discrete act or single
"occurrence," even in cases where there was a connection among
various discrete acts.147  The Court concluded that "each discrete
discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that
act."148 Accordingly, the plaintiff could only file a charge to cover
discrete acts that "occurred" within the appropriate time period.1 49
The Court noted, however, that the time period for filing a charge is
subject to "equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel,"," 0 allowing
plaintiffs some flexibility even in cases involving discrete
discriminatory acts. The Court warned, however, that the equitable
doctrines were to "be applied sparingly." 5 1
Although in unanimous agreement with respect to discrete
discriminatory acts, the Court was sharply divided on the hostile
142. Id. at 2070.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(e)(1) (2000).
144. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 122 S. Ct. at 2070.
145. Id. at 2071, 2077.
146. Id. at 2071.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2072.
149. Id. at 2073.
150. Id. at 2072.
151. Id.
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environment claim. Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, Justice Thomas concluded that hostile environment claims
should be treated differently in the application of the filing period.
Justice Thomas first recognized that hostile environment claims
were "different in kind from discrete acts." 12 "Their very nature," he
indicated, "involves repeated conduct,"153 which occurs "over a series
of days or perhaps years."154 Accordingly, the question with regard to
hostile environment claims became whether a court may, for the
purposes of determining liability, review all actionable hostile
conduct, including those acts that occur outside the filing period."'
Justice Thomas noted that Title VII requires only that a plaintiff
file a charge within a certain number of days "after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred."' 56  Since a "hostile
environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that
collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment practice,'"
continued Justice Thomas, "it does not matter ... that some of the
component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the
statutory period.""' So long as "an act contributing to the claims
occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile
environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of
determining liability." "' "A court's task," Justice Thomas added, "is
to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains
are part of the same actionable hostile environment practice, and if
so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period."" 9 Turning
to the case at hand, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding
that "the pre- and post-limitations period incidents involve[d] the
same type of employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and
were perpetrated by the same managers."160
Before concluding, the Court attempted to provide protection
for employers who fear hostile environment claims extending over
long periods of time. The Court noted that since the filing period is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, the filing period is
152. Id. at 2073.
153. Id.
154. Id.




159. Id. at 2076.
160. Id.
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subject to "waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling 'when equity so
requires."' 161 The Court also noted that an employer in this situation
may raise a laches defense if a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing suit
and as a result prejudices the defendant. 1 62 The Court, however, did
not say how these doctrines are to be applied and what the
consequences will be if the defenses are successfully raised.16 1
Justice O'Connor wrote for the dissenting and concurring
justices. In a paragraph joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Breyer (who also joined the majority opinion), Justice O'Connor
addressed the Court's treatment of discrete discriminatory acts. In
response to the Court's comment that filing a timely charge with the
EEOC was not a jurisdictional requirement, but instead was subject
to equitable doctrines such as waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling,
Justice O'Connor noted that claims involving discrete discriminatory
acts should be subject to "some version of the discovery rules." 1 In
particular, noted Justice O'Connor, "the charge-filing period
precludes recovery based on discrete actions that occurred more than
180 or 300 days after the employee had, or should have had, notice of
the discriminatory act. 165
In the rest of her opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Kennedy, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's treatment
of hostile environment claims. The dissenting opinion maintained
that the fact that hostile environment claims are comprised of a series
of acts in no way supports extending the filing period to include pre-
limitations period events. Such an extension would enable plaintiffs
to "sleep on [their] rights. 166
As with other cases in this area, the Court's decision in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. answers some questions and leaves many
others open. The Court expressly indicated that the opinion did not
address the timely filing question with respect to "pattern or practice"
claims brought by private litigants.'67 Similarly, the Court left open
the question when, in discrete discriminatory acts cases, the time
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2077. See Brown-Mitchell v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 267 F.3d 825, 827
(8th Cir. 2001)("for laches to apply defendant must persuade the court that (1) the plaintiff
unreasonably and inexcusably delayed filing the lawsuit and (2) prejudice to the defendant
resulted from the delay").
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2078 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2078-79.
167. Id. at 2073 n.9.
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period begins to run. The Court recognized that an issue that may
arise is "whether the time begins to run when the injury occurs as
opposed to when the injury reasonable should have been
discovered.""" Finally, by making it clear that equitable doctrines
may be used to extend the filing period for discrete acts, and to
protect employers from stale hostile environment claims, the Court
opened the door for future litigation.'69
3. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.
The Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A. 7 0 addressed
"whether a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit must
allege specific facts that would establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green." 7 1
In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff, Akos Swierkiewicz, was a 53-year-
old native of Hungary.1 72 He worked for Sorema, a French
reinsurance company headquartered in New York. After six years as
a senior vice-president and chief underwriting officer, 173 Swierkiewicz
was demoted and his duties were transferred to a 32-year-old
employee.174 The CEO stated his desire to "energize" the
underwriting department."' Swierkiewicz claimed that his
replacement was less qualified and less experienced.1 76  After his
demotion, Swierkiewicz was isolated and excluded from business
decisions, before ultimately being terminated.
Swierkiewicz sued Sorema for national origin discrimination
under Title VII and for age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)."' The district
court dismissed his complaint because Swierkiewicz did not
adequately allege a prima facie case, since the circumstances alleged
168. Id. at 2073 n.7.
169. See, e.g., Shields v. Fort James Corp., 305 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2002)(remanding to
district court with directions to allow employer to plead laches as a defense in a hostile work
enviornment race discrimination case).
170. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
171. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).





177. Id. at 509.
178. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
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did not support an inference of discrimination. 79 The Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal because Swierkiewicz's complaint failed to
allege the elements of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.""
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that "an employment
discrimination complaint need not include such facts [to make out a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas] and instead must contain
only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,'" which is the standard required under
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
To plead a prima facie case of employment discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas, as the Second Circuit required, a plaintiff must
allege that he is a member of a protected class, he was otherwise
qualified for the job, he suffered an adverse employment action, and
the circumstances supported an inference of discrimination.'82 The
Supreme Court disagreed with this pleading requirement, and stated,
"The prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas ...
is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement."1 8 3
In addition, the Court found it inappropriate to require a
complaint to plead the McDonnell Douglas criteria because
McDonnell Douglas does not apply to all employment discrimination
cases.184 McDonnell Douglas only applies when the plaintiff does not
have direct evidence, but discovery might uncover direct evidence."'
Thus, according to the Court, it would be "incongruous to require a
plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts
than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if
direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.",1 6 The Court noted
that a prima facie case is a "flexible evidentiary standard," and
therefore "should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for
discrimination cases."'87
The Court found that requiring the plaintiff to plead the
elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case conflicts with Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) only
179. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
182. Id. at 510.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 511.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 511-12.
187. Id. at 512.
188. Id.
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requires a complaint to include "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief.""' In Conley v.
Gibson,9 0 the Supreme Court explained that the complaint must
merely "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests."191 While Rule 9 requires
heightened pleading standards for fraud and mistake, the Court found
that employment discrimination cases do not require this heightened
standard, and thus a complaint of employment discrimination "must
satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a)."'92 Finally, the
Court concluded that Swierkiewicz's "complaint easily satisfie[d] the
requirements of Rule 8(a) because it [gave] respondent fair notice of
the basis for petitioner's claims." 9 '
Swierkiewicz resolved a circuit split over the pleading
requirements for an employment discrimination complaint. While
appellate courts should have agreed on the proper pleading
requirements after Conley, the Court in Swierkiewicz held once and
for all that Rule 8(a) governs the complaint, and the prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas is only an evidentiary standard.
C. Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc.
In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.94 the Supreme Court considered
whether an agreement between an employer and an employee to
arbitrate employment-related disputes bars the EEOC from pursuing
victim-specific judicial relief, such as backpay, reinstatement, and
damages, in an enforcement action alleging that the employer has
violated Title I of the ADA.'95
In Waffle House, Eric Baker agreed in his application for
employment with Waffle House to arbitrate any dispute or claim
arising out of his employment.196 Shortly after he began his position
as a grill operator, he suffered a seizure at work and Waffle House
189. Id.
190. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
191. Id. at 47.
192. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513.
193. Id. at 514.
194. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
195. Id. at 282.
196. Id.
2152002]
216 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol.6:189
discharged him.' Baker did not initiate arbitration proceedings;
instead filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC claiming his
discharge violated the ADA.'98
The EEOC filed an enforcement action in district court under
section 107(a) of the ADA 99 and section 102 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,20 but Baker was not a party to the suit.20 1 The EEOC sought
injunctive relief, plus specific relief for Baker, including backpay,
reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.20 2
Waffle House filed a petition under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)20 3 to either stay the suit and compel arbitration or to dismiss
the suit. 2 04 The district court denied Waffle House's motion based on
its finding that Baker's actual employment contract did not contain an
arbitration provision.05
The Court of Appeals held that the arbitration agreement
between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose suit by the EEOC
because the EEOC was not a party to the contract and because the
EEOC has independent statutory authority to bring suit. 206 However,
the Court of Appeals found that the policy goals of the FAA which
favor enforcing private arbitration agreements outweighed the
EEOC's purpose of protecting the public interest when the EEOC
seeks victim-specific relief, and therefore the EEOC's remedies in an
enforcement action should be limited to injunctive relief when an
employee signs a mandatory arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. 207  The
Court held that "the EEOC has the authority to pursue victim specific
relief regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have
chosen to resolve their disputes."208 Thus, even if an employee signs a
mandatory arbitration agreement, the EEOC still has the authority to
sue the employer for the full range of remedies, including backpay,
197. Id. at 283. Interestingly, the stated reason for firing Baker was Waffle House's concern
with Baker's benefit and safety. Arguably, Waffle House had a strong defense under the
Court's decision in Echazabal.
198. Id.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000).
200. Id. § 1981(a).
201. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
202. Id. at 283-84.
203. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
204. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 284.
205. Id.
206. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
207. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 298.
208. Id. at 295.
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reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages for the individual
employee.209
The Supreme Court proffered several reasons for its decision.
First, the Court noted that the amendments to Title VII, including the
1991 amendment, "unambiguously authorize the EEOC to obtain the
relief that it seeks in its complaint if it can prove its case against
[Waffle House]."210 Further, the Court cited Occidental Life Insur-
ance Co. of California v. EEOC2 H and General Telephone Co. of
Northwest v. EEOC,2 12 for the proposition that a cause of action
brought by the EEOC does not merely derive from the rights of an
aggrieved individual, but is rather a separate cause of action.213 Thus,
the EEOC may pursue backpay, reinstatement, compensatory and
punitive damages, regardless of the existence of an arbitration
agreement between the employee and employer.2 14
Second, the Court stated that the purpose of the FAA was "to
place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts." 215 The Court stressed that the language of the contract
defined the scope of disputes subject to arbitration.216 Accordingly,
"nothing in the [FAA] authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any
issues, or by any parties, that are not already covered in the
agreement."2 17 Thus, so long as the EEOC is not a party to the
arbitration contract, the EEOC may still bring suit against the
1218
employer.
Third, the Court noted that the EEOC is "the master of its own
case," and has "authority to evaluate the strength of the public
interest at stake." 219 The agency, not the courts, should determine
whether public resources should be used to recover victim-specific
relief, and if the agency so chooses, it may proceed in a judicial
forum.2 2 0
209. See id. at 297.
210. Id. at 287. The Court analyzed Title VII to define the EEOC's authority in this ADA
case because the EEOC has the same powers under the ADA as it has under Title VII. Id. at
285-86.
211. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
212. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
213. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 287-88.
214. Id. at 287.
215. Id. at 289 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
216. Id. at 294.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 295-96.
219. Id. at 291.
220. Id. at 291-92.
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Fourth, the Court found that not allowing the EEOC to pursue
victim-specific relief would be both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive. 2 2 1 It would be over-inclusive because punitive damages
actually serve a great public function by punishing the employer, and
such damages may have a greater impact on the employer than
injunctive relief.2 2 Punitive damages serve a public function, which is
the purpose of the EEOC's involvement. 2 23 Further, allowing the
EEOC to only pursue injunctive relief would be under-inclusive
because "injunctive relief, although seemingly not 'victim-specific,'
can be seen as more closely tied to the employee's injury than to any
public interest." 2 24  Finally, the Court mentioned that the issue
remained open "whether a settlement or arbitration judgment would
affect the validity of the EEOC's claim or the character of relief the
EEOC may seek." 2 2 5
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the majority's decision
conflicted with the FAA and the principle that "the EEOC must take
a victim of discrimination as it finds him."226 Justice Thomas asserted
that while the EEOC had the statutory right under Title VII to bring
suit, it was not entitled to obtain a particular remedy.227 The Court,
not the EEOC, should determine the appropriate remedy.228 Justice
Thomas stated two reasons supporting his position that by allowing
the EEOC to obtain victim-specific remedies, the Court
impermissibly allowed the EEOC to do "on behalf of Baker" that
which Baker could not do for himself.2 29
First, Justice Thomas asserted, "To the extent that the EEOC is
seeking victim-specific relief in court for a particular employee, it is
able to obtain no more relief for that employee than the employee
could recover for himself by bringing his own lawsuit." 23 0 He noted
that the EEOC may not recover victim-specific relief if the employee
has waived or settled a discrimination claim, and thus the EEOC
should not be allowed to obtain victim-specific relief for Baker since
221. Id. at 294-95.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 295.
224. Id. (citing Occidental, 432 U.S. at 383).
225. Id. at 297.
226. Id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined
Justice Thomas in dissent.
227. Id. at 301.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 298, 300, 304.
230. Id. at 305.
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Baker waived his right to a judicial forum by entering the arbitration
agreement.
Second, Justice Thomas argued that allowing the EEOC to do on
behalf of Baker that which Baker could not do for himself
contravened the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements embodied in the FAA." 23 2 Under the Court's holding,
Justice Thomas asserted, an arbitration agreement between an
employee and an employer was reduced to a nullity,233 and an
employer would be faced with the difficult task of "defending itself in
two different forums against two different parties seeking precisely
the same relief.'"234 Therefore, employers utilizing arbitration
agreements would, under the majority's holding, be under a serious
disadvantage, which discourages the use of arbitration agreements
and is inconsistent with the policies of the FAA.235
Justice Thomas further argued that the majority's opinion may
allow the EEOC to obtain victim-specific relief for an employee in
court after the employee has already settled. 236 This could discourage
employers from entering settlement agreements and "frustrate
Congress' desire to expedite relief for victims of discrimination." 23 7
In conclusion, Justice Thomas found that "the EEOC's statutory
authority to enforce the ADA can be easily reconciled with the
FAA." 23 8 Congress encouraged the use of arbitration to resolve ADA
disputes, so the EEOC should follow the intent of Congress and
resolve disputes through arbitration.240
Evaluating the implications of this case depends in part on what
one believes will be the likely outcome of the Court's decision. The
majority was concerned that if it were to decide that the EEOC was
bound by Waffle House's arbitration agreement, the enforcement
machinery crafted by Congress would have been seriously
compromised. The EEOC would have been left with a weaker
enforcement power, because without the possibility of victim specific
231. Id.
232. Id. at 308. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
233. Id. at 308-09.
234. Id. at 309.
235. Id. at 310.
236. Id. at 311.
237. Id. at 312.
238. Id. at 313.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 314.
2002] 219
220 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol.6:189
relief its lawsuits would have been "devoid of any real clout."2 4 1
Employers would have continued the rush initiated in the 1990s by
the Court's decision in Gilmer2 42 to incorporate arbitration
requirements in employment contracts, knowing that both the
employee and the EEOC will be unable to litigate any discrimination
claims. By allowing the EEOC to continue to seek victim-specific
relief, even when the employee was bound by the arbitration
agreement, the Court might have been trying to prevent such an
outcome.
On the other hand, as pointed out by Justice Thomas' the Court's
decision might have the effect of eviscerating the arbitration
agreement and placing employers using arbitration agreements in the
worst possible scenario of having to defend themselves in "two
different forum against two different parties seeking precisely the
same relief." 243 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the
threat of EEOC litigation is substantial enough to affect employer
decisions whether to utilize arbitration agreements.
The EEOC files a very small number of lawsuits each year,24
suggesting that Justice Thomas' concerns are unwarranted. It also
appears unlikely that employers will turn away from arbitration
agreements because of the likely small possibility that the EEOC will
choose to litigate on its own.
An important question raised by the Court's decision is whether
the EEOC will be allowed to pursue a claim in cases where the
employee has actually gone through arbitration. Will an arbitration
award trump the EEOC's right to litigate? This important issue, left
unanswered by the Court, is likely to generate further litigation.
III. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
A. FMLA: Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.
In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. ,245 the first Family and
241. Thomas Osborne, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.: The Right Decision for the Right
Reasons, 53 LAB. L.J. 53, 59 (2002).
242. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
243. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 309 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. See id. at 290 n.7.
245. 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
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Medical Leave Act (FMLA)246 case decided by the Supreme Court,
the Court was asked to decide whether a Department of Labor
(DOL) regulation implementing the FMLA was valid. The plaintiff,
Tracy Ragsdale, was diagnosed with cancer. Pursuant to the leave
plan of her employer, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. ("Wolverine"),
she received seven months of unpaid sick leave.2 47  However,
Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that twelve weeks of this leave
would count as FMLA leave.2 48 After she was on leave for thirty
weeks, Wolverine refused to grant Ragsdale more leave or part-time
work and terminated her.249
Ragsdale sued Wolverine relying on a DOL regulation which
provided, "If an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the
employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave
taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement." 25 0
Thus, Ragsdale argued, her thirty weeks of leave did not count
against her FMLA leave entitling her to twelve additional weeks.251
The district court granted summary judgment for Wolverine,
finding that the regulation conflicted with the FMLA because the
FMLA only requires twelve weeks of unpaid leave.252 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed. 253 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the
regulation is contrary to the Act and beyond the Secretary of Labor's
authority. ,254
The standard the Court applied reflected a limit on the deference
given to the Secretary. "A regulation cannot stand if it is 'arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' "255 The Court found
that the regulation was contrary to the FMLA for many reasons.
First, the Court stated, " [E]ven assuming the additional notice
requirement is valid, [an issue left undecided by the Court] the
categorical penalty the Secretary imposes for its breach is contrary to
the Act's remedial design." 256 The provision categorically penalized
246. 29 U.S.C. §H 2601-54 (2000).
247. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1158-59.
248. Id. at 1159.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1159,1161 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2001)).
251. Id. at 1159.
252. Id.
253. 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
254. 122 S. Ct. at 1159.
255. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)).
256. Id. at 1161.
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an employer by "denying it any credit for leave granted before
notice," and requiring the employer to award an additional twelve
weeks of unpaid leave if it failed to individually notify an employee
that certain leave would count against the FMLA allotment.2 57
Second, the Court found that the penalty was unconnected to any
prejudice suffered by the employee, because the employee was not
even required to show that she would have acted differently had the
employer provided individual notice.258 Third, the Court found the
categorical penalty to be incompatible with the FMLA's
comprehensive remedial scheme. 25 9 According to the Court, "the
regulation establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the
employee's exercise of FMLA rights was impaired."26() Thus, the
regulation fundamentally altered the FMLA by "reliev[ing]
employees of the burden of proving any real impairment of their
rights and resulting prejudice." 261 For example, the Court noted that
Ragsdale never showed that she would have taken less leave or
intermittent leave had she received notice. Without the showing of
prejudice, the regulation's categorical penalty was inappropriate.262
In response, the government justified the categorical penalty as a
necessary administrative convenience. The Court dismissed this
argument, noting that the FMLA's remedial scheme required a case-
by-case examination.263 In addition, the Court noted that even if the
categorical penalty was within the Secretary's authority, "this
particular rule would still be an unreasonable choice," because, when
generalizations fail to apply in the majority of cases, a categorical rule
is not justified.264 In only a few cases is twelve additional weeks of
leave a proper remedy, because many employees would take the
leave even if they were notified that it would be counted against their
FMLA allotment.26 5
Next, the Court stated that the penalty "subverts the careful
balance" between employer and employee interests, which limited




260. Id at 1162.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1163.
263. Id. at 1162.
264. Id. at 1163.
265. Id.
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weeks. 266 "Courts and agencies must respect and give effect to these
sorts of compromises," the Court advised.267
Also, the Court found the regulation to be inconsistent with
Congress' intent.268 Section 2619 is the only FMLA provision
addressing notice, and it requires an employer to post general notice
about FMLA rights, with a willful violation resulting in a $100
penalty.269 In contrast, the regulation provided a disproportionate
penalty, even if the violation was inadvertent.27 0
Finally, section 2653 of the FMLA provided that "nothing in this
Act ... shall be construed to discourage employers from adopting or
retaining leave policies more generous than any policies that comply
with the requirements of this Act." 2 7 1 The regulation, however, was in
tension with section 2653 because compliance with the designation
requirement was easier if the employer only offered twelve weeks of
272leave, because then all leave would be designated as FMLA leave.
Justice O'Connor dissented and argued that the Secretary was
justified in requiring individualized notice, answering a question the
majority failed to address.273 She noted that the Secretary determined
there was a need for individualized notice, so that employees would
know the FMLA applied to them, and could plan to take intermittent
leave, or substitute paid leave. 2 74 Thus, Justice O'Connor argued,
" [T]he Secretary's decision to require individualized notice is not
arbitrary and capricious." 275 Further, Justice O'Connor believed that
"nothing in this Act constrains the Secretary's ability to secure
compliance with [the individualized notice] requirement by refusing
to count the leave against the employer's statutory obligation." 276
It is hard to underestimate the significance of Ragsdale. As the
first FMLA case to reach the Supreme Court, Ragsdale provides
some clues as to how the court might decide future FMLA's cases.
The Ragsdale decision shows a Supreme Court concerned with
the possibility that DOL, through its regulatory authority, will try to





271. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (2000)).
272. Id.
273. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1166.
276. Id. at 1165.
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extend the substantive protections of the FMLA beyond what the
Court considers to have been Congress' intent. If this is the case, we
might observe a scenario similar to that reflected in the Court's
disposition of cases under the ADA.
To the extent that employers understand the significance of
Ragsdale in this way, as it appears they have, 277 we are likely to see an
increase in litigation testing several other FMLA regulations enacted
by the DOL. Employer advocates have suggested that following
Ragsdale other FMLA regulations might be called into question.27 8
For example, the DOL's definition of "serious health condition"
under the FMLA is presently very broad allowing, according to
management advocates, "an employee to take FMLA leave for
almost any affliction for which he or she visits a doctor once and
obtains a prescription. 279
A DOL regulation prohibiting employers from counting FMLA
leave against attendance records may also come under fire. The
regulation prohibits employers from counting FMLA leave under "no
fault" attendance policies. 28 0 This regulation could be subject to
challenge if it were to be interpreted as, for example, allowing an
employee with FMLA absences to claim to be entitled to a perfect
attendance bonus in cases were the employer provides that
281incentive.
Finally, all Courts of Appeals have rejected a DOL regulation
which waives eligibility requirements if an employer failed to notify
an employee about whether the employee was eligible for FMLA
leave. 282  The Supreme Court, after Ragsdale, would seem more
inclined to follow suit.
According to Renuka Raofield, an attorney for the National
Partnership of Women and Families, two major issues were left open
277. Consider the statement by Ann Elizabeth Reesman, General Counsel of the
management group Equal Employment Advisory Council, describing the ruling "as extremely
significant" since it eliminated what management groups thought was "the most egregious
extension" of the FMLA. See Supreme Court Knocks Down DOL Rule Affecting Employers
that Fail to Give Notice, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 20, 2002, at AA-1.
278. See Enforcement of FMLA Notice Regulations Left Open After Ragsdale, Attorney
Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 27, 2002, at C-1.
279. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (2002). See Enforcement of FMLA Notice Regulations, supra note
278.
280. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)(2002).
281. See Enforcement of FMLA Notice Regulations, supra note 278.
282. Id. § 825.110(d) (2002). See e.g., Woodford v. Community Action of Greene County,
Inc., 268 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2001); Evanoff v. Minneapolis Public Schools, II Fed Appx. 670 (8th
cir. 2001); Brungart v. Bell South Telecomms., 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000).
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by the majority's decision. 2 83 First, the Court failed to answer whether
notice and designation regulations will be upheld in the future.
Second, the Court failed to address what penalty for failure to comply
with DOL regulations might be upheld.
In short, Ragsdale was the first case in which the Supreme Court
addressed an FMLA issue, and the Supreme Court responded in a
pro-employer manner. After Ragsdale, one wonders how diligent
employers must actually be in abiding by the FMLA.
B. ERISA
1. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran
In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran,284 the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether the independent review provision of
the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act285 was preempted
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).286 The
Illinois HMO Act required health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) to submit disputes with a patient's primary care doctor over
the "medical necessity" of a proposed treatment to independent
physician review and to cover the treatment if the outside reviewer
found it necessary.
The plaintiff, an ERISA plan beneficiary, took advantage of the
state statute when the HMO that provided benefits for her ERISA
medical benefits plan refused to pay for a surgical procedure she had
undergone. Under the procedures provided in the Illinois HMO
statute, the claim was reviewed by an independent physician who
found the procedure to be "medically necessary.""2 Rush refused to
concede that the surgery was medically necessary and denied the
plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff sued in state court for reimbursement under
the Illinois HMO Act. Rush removed the case to federal court,
arguing that the complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits and was
thus completely preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement
288provisions.
The district court agreed with Rush, denying the claim on the
283. Enforcement of FMLA Notice Regulations Left Open After Ragsdale, supra note 278.
284. 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
285. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 125, §4-10 (2000).
286. 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 (2000).
287. Rush Prudential, 122 S. Ct. at 2157.
288. Id.
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ground that ERISA preempted the Illinois independent review
statute. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The
court found Moran's reimbursement claim under state law completely
preempted by ERISA, and thus was properly removed to federal
court. However, the Seventh Circuit did not agree that the
substantive provisions of the Illinois's HMO act were preempted,
because ERISA's insurance "saving clause" applied, saving the state
statute from preemption. The court also found that the independent
medical review requirement did not constitute a forbidden
"alternative remedy" under prior Supreme Court precedent. The
court noted that a state law that falls within the saving clause may
nevertheless be preempted if the law conflicts with a substantive
provision of ERISA, for example by creating an alternative remedy
to ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. The court found, however,
that the Illinois HMO act could not be characterized as creating an
alternative remedy that conflicts with ERISA.289
The Supreme Court affirmed both aspects of the Seventh
Circuit's decision. The 5-4 decision authored by Justice Souter
described the statutory framework. ERISA is intended to
"safeguar[d]... the establishment, operation, and administration" 29 0
of employee benefit plans by providing minimum standards that
assure the equitable character and financial soundness of the covered
plans. ERISA also expressly makes clear that it "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan,. . ."2 9' The act also contains a "saving clause"
which saves from this broad preemption any state laws regulating
insurance, banking, or securities.292
The Court noted that it was "beyond dispute" that the Illinois
HMO Act "relates to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of
ERISA. As such, said the Court, it will be saved from preemption
only if it also "regulates insurance." 293 The Court found that it did,
saving the Illinois act from ERISA preemption.
The Court reached this conclusion based on a two part analysis.
First, the Court inquired whether under a "common sense"
understanding, the state act did not just have an impact on the
289. 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
290. 29 U.S.C. §1001(a) (2000).
291. Id. §1144(a).
292. Id. §1144(b)(2)(A).
293. Rush Prudential, 122 S. Ct. at 2159.
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insurance industry but also was "specifically directed toward that
industry." 294 Insurance contracts, at their core, involve "the spreading
and underwriting of a policyholder's risk." 295 The Illinois act did
nothing more than make the independent medical review a
requirement of the HMO contract, a contract that involved insurance
because of its risk shifting functions. Accordingly, the Court
concluded, the Illinois HMO Act regulated insurance because it was
directed at the HMO industry as insurers that assume the financial
risk of providing the promised benefits. The HMO's status as a
provider of the health care benefits did not alter the Court's analysis.
"Nothing in the saving clause requires an either-or-choice between
health care and insurance in deciding a preemption question, and as
long as providing insurance fairly accounts for the application of state
law, the saving clause may apply." 2 96
In addition to this "common sense" analysis the Court evaluated
the state statute under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.297 Under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which spares "the business of insurance"
from federal regulation, a state law is considered as regulating "the
business of insurance" where the practice or provision transfers
policyholder risk; is an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and insured; and is limited to entities within the
* * 298insurance industry.
The Court noted that since the factors listed in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act were "guideposts," a state law need not meet all three
conditions to be within ERISA's saving clause. The Court concluded
that the Illinois act satisfied the second and third factors. Regarding
the second factor, the Court noted, the independent review
requirement affected the "policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured" since it translated "the relationship under the HMO
agreement into concrete terms of specific obligation or freedom from
duty." 29 9 Regarding the third factor, the Court found that the law
targeted "a practice ... limited to entities within the insurance
industry." Since the state statute regulated the application of HMO
contracts and provided for review of claims' denials, "it is clear that
294. Id. at 2159.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 2160.
297. 15 U.S.C. §1012 (2000). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that the business of
insurance be subject to state regulation.
298. Rush Prudential, 122 S. Ct. at 2163.
299. Id. at 2164.
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[the Illinois HMO Act] does not apply to entities outside the
insurance industry. 300
Having decided that the Illinois law fell under the "saving
clause," the Court addressed Rush's contention that the law was
preempted anyway because "congressional intent is so clear that it
overrides a statutory provision designed to save state law from being
preempted."3 01 According to Rush, the state law should have been
preempted because it provided an "alternative remedy" of the kind
that the Court itself had disparaged in prior rulings. 3 02 Rush argued
that the independent medical review and the requirement that the
plan adhere to the decision made at the review level amounted to an
alternative remedy which subverted congressional intent. The
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court noted that while the
independent medical review procedure "may well settle the fate of a
benefit claim," the Illinois act "does not enlarge the claim beyond the
benefits available" under ERISA.303
Rush then argued that the Illinois law interfered unreasonably
with Congress' intention to provide an uniform federal regime of
rights and obligations under ERISA. In particular, Rush argued, the
independent review requirement created a sort of arbitration that
impermissibly supplanted the availability of judicial review and the
deferential standard of review of benefits denials. The Court rejected
both arguments. First, the Court noted, the independent review
requirement under the statute was significantly different from
arbitration. The reviewer did not have free-ranging power to
construe contract terms, but instead confined the review to the
question of whether the procedure was "medically necessary." 3 0 4 The
Court likened the independent review to a second opinion instead of
to arbitration. Second, the Court indicated that the Illinois law did
not clash with any deferential standard for review, since ERISA itself
says nothing about a standard and nothing in the federal statute
requires that medical necessity decisions be "discretionary. 305
Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, dissented, criticizing the majority for taking the
"unprecedented step" of allowing an ERISA plan beneficiary to
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 11 (1987).
303. Rush Prudential, 122 S. Ct. at 2167.
304. Id. at 2169.
305. Id.
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"short circuit ERISA's remedial scheme by allowing her claim for
benefits to be determined in the first instance through an arbitral-like
procedure provided under the Illinois law, and by a decisionmaker
other than a court."306 Justice Thomas argued that the Court's
decision was in conflict with the Court's precedents, and undermined
the national uniformity of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
providing for judicial review of benefit denials in federal or state
court.
Justice Thomas warned the Court of the possible consequences
of its ruling. Justice Thomas noted the possible detrimental effect of
this decision on health care providers' efforts to control upward
spiraling costs, and the possible disincentive the decision created to
the formation of employee health benefit plains.o0
Given that, as the Court noted, similar laws exist in at least forty
other states,308 the impact of Rush Prudential cannot be under-
estimated. The decision should embolden states who have not
enacted such laws to do so, and may also motivate those states with
existing laws to expand them to at least incorporate procedures
similar to those under the Illinois law.
In doing so, however, state legislatures should be cautious. First,
because this was a 5-4 decision, it is not clear how strong the Court's
feeling is in this area. Second, the Court indicated that there are
limits to its willingness to "save" these state laws. In rejecting Rush's
argument that the Illinois law unreasonably interfered with the
uniform federal regime intended under ERISA, the Court cautioned
that an independent review requirement "with procedures so
elaborate, and burdens so onerous, might undermine" ERISA's
scheme and thus be preempted under federal law.309
2. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,310 the
Supreme Court encountered the issue of whether section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA,"' which authorizes civil actions, allows a health plan to
306. Id. at 2171-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
307. Id. 2177-78.
308. Id. at 2161 (citing Aspen Health Law and Compliance Center, Managed Care Law
Manual 31-32 (Supp. 6, Nov. 1997)).
309. Id. at 2168.
310. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
311. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
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enforce a reimbursement provision of an ERISA plan.3 12
In Great-West, the defendant, Janette Knudson, was rendered
quadriplegic after a car accident.3 1 3 Because her then-husband was
employed by the plaintiff, Earth Systems, Inc., Janette was covered by
the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth
Systems, Inc. ("the Plan").3 14  The Plan covered $411,157.11 of
Janette's medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West
Life & Annuity Insurance Co. 15 The Plan contained a reimbursement
provision that gave it the right to recover from the beneficiary any
payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary became
entitled to recover from a third party.31
Subsequent to the accident, the Knudsons sued the car
manufacturer and several other alleged tortfeasors.3 17 The parties to
that lawsuit settled for $650,000.318 The money was primarily
attributed to a trust for Janette's medical expenses ("the Special
Needs Trust") and to pay attorney's fees, but $13,828.70 was reserved
for past medical expenses, which was to satisfy Great-West under the
reimbursement provision. 319 Apparently dissatisfied with this amount,
Great-West filed suit against the Knudsons seeking injunctive and de-
claratory relief under section 502(a)(3) to enforce the reimbursement
provision and compel payment of the $411,157.11. Great-West added
Earth Systems and the Plan as plaintiffs.320
The district court refused to compel the payment because "the
Plan limited its right of reimbursement to the amount received by
[the Knudsons] from third parties for past medical treatment, an
amount that the state court determined was $13,828.70. "321 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, but for different reasons, and held that the relief
sought by the plaintiff was not equitable relief, and thus was not
authorized under section 502(a)(3).322  Under section 502(a)(3), a
312. Great West, 534 U.S. at 206. Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a civil action, "by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates ... the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of ... the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3) (2000).




317. Id. at 207.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 208.
320. Id. at 208-09.
321. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original).
322. Id. at 209-10.
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participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary can bring a civil action "to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief to enforce the terms of the plan."3 23
In other words, section 502(a)(3) only applies when equitable relief is
sought.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were merely seeking
legal relief in that they sought to impose "personal liability on [the
Knudsons] for a contractual obligation to pay money," and, thus, the
plaintiffs could not bring an action under section 502(a)(3).324 The
Court relied on Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,2 1 in which it held that
"equitable relief' in ' 502(a)(3) must refer to 'those categories of relief
that were . .. typically available in equity' ..... 326
The Court systematically disposed of all of the plaintiffs'
arguments. First, the plaintiffs argued that they merely sought to
enjoin the Knudsons' failure to reimburse the Plan. The Court stated
that "an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a
contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary obligation,
was not typically available in equity." 27 Thus, since the plaintiffs
merely sought specific performance of a contract, their suit was not
actionable under section 502(a)(3)."
Second, the plaintiffs argued that their suit was allowed under
section 502(a)(3) because they sought restitution. The Court found
that the restitution sought in this case was a legal remedy.3 29 Although
restitution can be either a legal or an equitable remedy, the
classification depends upon the nature of the relief sought. 330 The
Court stated, "[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action generally
must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to
restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's
possession. 331 Here, the funds that the plaintiffs claimed entitlement
to were not in the defendants' possession,332 and the plaintiffs sought
to impose personal liability on the defendants, so the suit was not
authorized.3 33
323. Id. at 211 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000)).
324. Id. at 230.
325. 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
326. 534 U.S. at 211 (emphasis in original).
327. Id. at 210-11.
328. Id. at 210-18.
329. Id. at 210-19.
330. Id. at 214.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 218.
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Third, the Court refused to accept the United States' argument
as amicus that the common law of trusts gave the plaintiffs equitable
remedies such that they could bring a section 502(a)(3) claim. 3 4 The
Court characterized the trust remedies as "inapposite" and found the
trust analogy did not give the plaintiffs a separate equitable action.335
Therefore, because the only relief that Great-West and Earth Systems
sought was legal relief, the Court held that section 502(a)(3) did not
* * 336
authorize the action.
Justice Stevens dissented and argued that an inclusive reading of
section 502(a)(3) showed that "Congress intended the word 'enjoin,'
as used in section 502(a)(3)(A), to authorize any appropriate order
that prohibits or terminates a violation of an ERISA plan... 337
Furthermore, he read "other" in section 502(a)(3)(B) as intended to
enlarge the scope of remedies available rather than contract a judge's
remedial authority.338 Finally, he argued that such an inclusive
reading of section 502(a)(3) would accomplish "Congress' goal of
providing a federal remedy for violations of the terms of plans
governed by ERISA. ,
Justice Ginsburg also dissented and argued that the majority
erred in relying on the "ancient classification" of law versus equity in
interpreting section 502(a)(3).340 According to Justice Ginsburg, the
majority's holding conflicted with Congress' goals in enacting ERISA,
because the strict classification of an equitable claim may mean that
suits involving the interpretation of an employee benefit plan will
have to be heard in state court, rather than federal court.341 Instead,
Justice Ginsburg suggested looking at the "substance of the relief"
and reading "equitable" to mean "whether relief of that kind was
'typically' available in equity."3 4 2 While the majority also relied on
Mertens, Justice Ginsburg stressed that the Court should look at the
entire category of relief sought, not whether a remedy was exclusively
available in equity.343 Accordingly, since Great-West sought
334. Id. at 219.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 221.
337. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 223.
340. Id. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 228 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.) (emphasis in
original).
343. Id.
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restitution, and restitution was a category of relief that was typically
available in equity, then Great-West's claim to enforce the
reimbursement provision should be allowed in federal court.344
The result of the Supreme Court's decision in Great-West is a
possible limitation on the federal court's ability to interpret ERISA
plan provisions. Of course, the Court left open the possibility that
Great-West could sue the trustee of the Special Needs Trust, since the
plaintiff would then be suing for particular funds that are in the
defendant's possession.3 45 Thus, the availability of a federal cause of
action under section 502(a)(3) may now depend upon the named
defendant.
C. Taxes, Pensions and Social Security Benefits
1. Social Security Taxes: United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc.
U.S. v. Fior D'Italia, Inc.,346 involved a dispute between the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and a restaurant/employer over the
calculation of the Social Security tax owed on employee tip income.
Employers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)
taxes (Social Security taxes), calculated as a percentage of the wages,
including tips, that their employees receive.347 The employer in this
case paid this tax based on the total amount of tips reported by its
employees. This amount, however, was significantly lower than the
amount of tips that appeared on the restaurant's credit card charge
slips. The IRS conducted a compliance check and assessed the
employer additional FICA taxes on what it deemed was unreported
tip income.4
This assessment was made using an "aggregate estimation"
method, under which the IRS simply divided total tips charged on
credit cards by total credit charge receipts.349 This amount ("tip rate")
was multiplied by the restaurant's total receipts, to obtain an estimate
of total tips.350 The restaurant sued for a refund, arguing that the tax
statutes did not authorize the IRS to use its "aggregate estimation"
344. Id.
345. See id. at 220.
346. 122 S. Ct. 2117 (2002).
347. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3111, 3121(q) (2000).
348. 122 S. Ct. at 2121.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 2121-22.
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method, but instead required the IRS first to determine the tips that
each individual employee received and, second, to use that
information in calculating the employer's total FICA liability."'
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court sided with the IRS. First,
the Court concluded that there was nothing in the statutory language
that could be interpreted to prevent the IRS from using the
"aggregate estimation" method.352
Second, the Court rejected the restaurant/employer's argument
that the "aggregate estimation" method was unreasonable. 3'
According to the employer, the "aggregate estimation" method will
sometimes include tips that should not count in calculating FICA
taxes.35" This method, argued the employer, can overstate the actual
amount of tips because it fails to account for a number of possibilities
(e.g., that some customer do not leave tips and that cash customers
tend to leave lower tips).' The Court dismissed these arguments,
noting that those considerations did not show that the aggregate
estimation method "falls outside the bounds of what is reasonable."3 56
Finally, the Court rejected the employer's argument that the IRS
was putting its aggregate estimate method to improper use, that is,
that the IRS was abusing its power. According to the Court, the
"abuse of power" argument "does not constitute a ground for holding
unlawful the IRS' use of aggregate estimates. "1 The Court noted
that the employer had not demonstrated that in this case that the IRS
had acted illegally.358 The Court refused to find an agency action
unreasonable in all cases simply because of the general possibility of
abuse.359
2. Coal Industry Retiree Health Act: Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.360 involved the Court's
interpretation of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of
1992.361 The 1992 Act is a complex regulatory framework which
351. Id. at 2122.
352. Id. at 2123.
353. Id. at 2125.
354. The Code exempts tip amounts of less than $20 in a month. I.R.C. §3121(a)(12)(B).
355. Fior D'Italia, 122 S. Ct. at 2117, 2125-27.
356. Id. at 2125.
357. Id. at 2126.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 2127.
360. 122 S. Ct. 941 (2002).
361. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-08, 9711-12, 9721-22 (2000).
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attempts to deal with the problem of severely underfunded pension
plans in a shrinking coal industry.362 The regulatory scheme generally
requires an employer with connections to the retirees to assume
responsibility for their benefits, and gives the authority to the
Commissioner of Social Security to assign beneficiaries among a
statutory group of defined entities. The dispute arose out of an
assignment of beneficiaries by the Commissioner to the Jericol
Mining Co., who twenty years earlier had acquired the assets of a now
defunct company. Jericol objected, arguing that the 1992 Act did not
authorize the specific assignment.
Under the 1992 Act, "signatory operators," companies that had
been signatories to industry-wide agreements before the enactment of
the act, were to assume responsibility for their retirees. While the
company whose assets Jericol acquired had been a signatory, Jericol
had never been a signatory.363 The Commissioner, however,
determined that Jericol was a "successor-in-interest" and could be
treated as if it were a signatory. Jericol argued that the
Commissioner's position did not have a basis in the statute. While the
statute allowed pension liability to be assigned to successors in
interests of related persons, it was silent as to the liability of
successors in interest of signatory operators. Since Jericol was a
successor in interest to a signatory operator, the Commissioner
exceeded her statutory authority in making the pension liability
assignment.3 64
The Commissioner responded that such a reading of the statute
would lead to an absurd outcome, imposing liability for retirees'
benefits on a successor-in-interest to a related person of a signatory,
but not to a successor-in-interest to the signatory. The Court was not
moved by this argument. According to the majority opinion, authored
by Justice Thomas, the statute was unambiguous, thus ending the
Court's inquiry. He noted that the 1992 Act had been the result of a
difficult political compromise, which although at first blush appeared
to lead to absurd outcomes, might be based on specific trade-offs
reached by Congress during the legislative process. The Court's role,
noted Justice Thomas, "is to interpret the language of the statute
enacted by Congress."365 Justice Thomas concluded, "We have stated
362. See William Funk, Supreme Court News, 27 SPG ADM. & REG. LAW NEWS 6 (2002).
363. Barnhart, 122 S. Ct. at 949.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 950.
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time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also
the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'"36
3. Social Security Act: Gisbrecht v. Barnhart and Barnhart v. Walton
In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,3 67 the Court upheld a provision in a
federal statute that allows lawyers to charge up to 25 percent of the
past-due benefits awarded to their Social Security disability clients.368
The attorneys involved in the case represented three individuals in
their actions seeking Social Security disability benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act.369 Pursuant to contingent-fee agreements
standard for Social Security claimant representation, the three
individuals had agreed to pay their lawyers 25 percent of all past-due
benefits recovered.3 70 The district court declined to give effect to the
attorney-client fee agreement. Instead, the court employed a
"lodestar" method, under which the number of hours reasonably
devoted to each case is multiplied by a reasonable hourly fee. 71 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court.3 7 2
Congress has regulated the permissible fees for representation of
individuals claiming Social Security benefits since 1965 through the
enactment of the Social Security Amendments.3 73 For judicial
proceedings the Amendments provide for "a reasonable fee. . . not in
excess of 25 percent of the ... past-due benefits" to successful
claimants.374
The question, according to the Court, was whether "the
contingent-fee agreement between claimant and counsel, if not in
excess of 25 percent" is presumptively reasonable under the statute,
or whether "courts should begin with a lodestar calculation?"3 7 1 In an
8-1 opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court sided
366. Id. at 956.
367. 122 S. Ct. 1817 (2002).
368. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2000).
369. Id. §405(g).
370. Gisbrecht, 122 S. Ct. at 1822.
371. Id. at 1823.
372. Gisbrecht v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 196 (9th Cir 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1817 (2002).
373. 42 U.S.C. § 406 (2000).
374. Id. § 406(b)(1)(A).
375. Gisbrecht, 122 S. Ct. at 1820.
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with the attorneys. The Court read the fee provision of the statute as
intending to control, but "not displace contingent-fee agreements as
the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing
Social Security claimants in court."376 Instead, the Court noted, the
statutory fee provision "calls for court review of such arrangements as
an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in
particular cases."377 According to the Court, the 25 percent of the
past-due benefits amounted to "one-boundary line. "31 Within that
boundary the attorneys for the successful claimants must show that
the fee sought "is reasonable for the services rendered." 379
In Barnhart v. Walton,380 the Court interpreted various statutory
provisions of the Social Security Act dealing with the definition of
disability. The Social Security Act authorizes payment for Title II
disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security
Income to individuals who have an "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable ... impairment .. . which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."381
The Social Security Administration has read the term
"inability"to include a "12 month" requirement, thus allowing a
claimant to receive benefits only where the "inability" has lasted, or is
expected to last, for at least twelve months.3 82 The agency interpreted
the term "expected to last" as applicable only when twelve months
had not yet passed since the onset of the inability.383 In cases where
the inability did not last twelve months the Administration
automatically assumed that the claimant had failed to meet the twelve
months duration requirement and thus was not entitled to Social
Security disability benefits.384
The case involved a claimant who applied for Social Security
disability benefits and supplemental security income after having
developed schizophrenia and associated depression, which caused
him to lose his job as a full time teacher. Because the claimant began




380. 122 S. Ct. 1265 (2002).
381. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A) (2000).
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to work on a part time basis eleven months after loosing his teaching
job, the Social Security Administration found that he was not entitled
to benefits."
In an opinion which primarily focused on the question of the
appropriate deference due administrative agencies, the Court first
held that the statute did not unambiguously forbid the Social Security
Administration regulation.38 6 While the statute could be subject to
other interpretations, it did not prohibit the interpretation attached
by the agency. The Court then found that the Administration
interpretation was reasonable in view of its compatibility with the
statute's objectives, the frequent intervention by Congress in
reenacting other relevant statutory provisions without making any
changes to the provision at issue, and the long period of time over
which the interpretation had been in place.387
Gisbrecht and Walton may prove to be significant cases, albeit for
very different reasons. By allowing attorneys to recover a greater
amount, albeit capped at 25 percent, than under the lodestart method
Grisbrecht should increase the interest of lawyers in taking these
cases, making it easier for employees to obtain the benefits they
might be entitled to under the Act."
Grisbrecht leaves some important issues unanswered. For
example, although in Gisbrecht the Court clearly rejected the
lodestart method for calculating attorney fees, it indicated that in
reviewing the reasonableness of the contingent fee, courts could
examine the hours spent as a factor. The Court, however, did not
provide any guidance as to what should the relationship be between
hours worked and the contingent fee. As noted by a practitioner in
the area, "If an attorney only wins I in 5 cases taken to federal court,
should that attorney be entitled to an hourly fee 5 times the average
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1269.
387. Id. The Court rejected two other arguments raised by the claimant. First, the claimant
argued that his part-time job from month 11 to month 12 should not have counted against him
because it was part of the "trial work" period that the statute grants to those "entitled" to
disability benefits. Second, he argued that even though he returned to work before the end of
the 12 month period, his "impairment" and his "inability" could have been "expected to last"
more than 12 months, entitling him to receive benefits. The Court rejected both of these
arguments as inconsistent with the Administration's regulations. Id. at 1272-73.
388. "The biggest benefit of the decision is that there are attorneys who will be willing to
take these types of cases." Statement by Jeffrey White, who wrote the amicus brief for the
Washington D.C.-based Association of Trial Lawyers of America, in support of the attorneys
seeking to uphold the contingent-fee agreement. 1 No. 22 ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT 7 (June 7,
2002).
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charged by federal court attorneys. Or is the purpose of examining
the time log merely to determine whether the attorney had worked
hard enough on the case to merit the contingent fee . . . If the latter,
doesn't that undermine the whole concept of the contingent fee? "3 89
Similarly, at face value Walton, by limiting the definition of
disability, makes it somewhat harder for employees to obtain certain
kinds of Social Security benefits. The greater significance of Walton
might however be in the area of judicial deference to administrative
agencies. As discussed later,390 this concern has generated interest
among legal commentators who have noted the potential significance
of Walton in this area.
IV. HEALTH AND SAFETY: CHAO V. MALLARD
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct)'9 requires
covered employers to provide their employees with a safe working
environment. Section 4(b)(1) of the OSHAct, however, states that
the Act does not apply where "other Federal agencies ... exercise
statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations
affecting occupational safety and health. "93 The issue before the
Supreme Court in Chao v. Mallard was whether the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) jurisdiction was
preempted by U.S. Coast Guard regulations.394
The case arose when an explosion on board an uninspected
barge, the "Mr. Beldon," killed four workers and injured several
others during oil drilling operations in Louisiana waters. With
respect to uninspected vessels, such as the Mr. Beldon, the Coast
Guard has authority to issue regulations pertaining to, among other
things, emergency equipment and cooking and heating areas on the
vessel.'9 Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Coast Guard inves-
389. See Mark Weissburg, Gisbrecht v. Barnhart: Contingent Fees Prevail Over Lodestart
Method, available at <http://ddbchicago.com/gisbrecht.html> (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
390. See infra notes 518-21 and accompanying text.
391. See e.g., Charles H. Kock, Judicial Review of Administrative Policy Making, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV, 375, 401 (2002) (pointing out that in Walton Justice Breyer appears to have
solidified his position "that policymaking within the agency's delegated authority would have
special force even if not developed through notice and comment rulemaking, i.e. not embodied
in a legislative rule."); Thomas Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 566, n.615 (2002) (discussing the
exchange between Justices Breyer and Scalia in Walton).
392. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000).
393. Id. § 653(b)(1).
394. 534 U.S. 235 (2002).
395. 46 U.S.C. §§ 6101-04, 6301-08 (2000).
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tigated the marine casualty and wrote a report.396 The Coast Guard's
report did not accuse the respondent, owner of the barge, of violating
any Coast Guard regulations. The Coast Guard's report also noted
that the Guard did not "regulate mineral drilling operations in state
waters."3 97 Based on information from the Coast Guard, OSHA cited
the respondent for three violations of the OSHAct. The citations
alleged that respondent failed promptly to evacuate employees on
board the drilling rig, failed to develop and implement an emergency
response plan to handle anticipated emergencies, and failed to train
1 * 398employees in emergency response.
The respondent argued that Section 4(b)(1) of the OSHAct
preempted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had
exclusive authority to enforce the standards on the barge and that the
vessel was not a workplace within the meaning of the section 4(a)
Act. The petitioner, Secretary of Labor, argued that because the
Coast Guard had not exercise its statutory authority, the Act did not
preempt OSHA jurisdiction.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the barge was a
"workplace" within the meaning of the OSHAct.3 99 The ALJ also
held that the Coast Guard had not preempted OSHA jurisdiction
because the Coast Guard did not exercise its statutory authority to
regulate the working condition at issue. The Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission declined to review the ALJ's decision
and assessed a financial penalty against respondent.40' The Fifth
Circuit reversed and held that the Coast Guard had exclusive
jurisdiction since the Coast-Guard had issued regulations concerning
life preservers and emergency instructions, among others.40 1
The Supreme Court considered both issues presented by the
respondent and held, in an 8-0 decision,40 2 that the Act did not
preempt OSHA's jurisdiction because (1) the Coast Guard did not
affirmatively regulate the working conditions at issue and (2) the
Coast Guard did not assert comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction
over working conditions on uninspected vessels. 403 The Court also
396. Mallard, 534 U.S. at 237.
397. Id. at 237-38.
398. Id. at 238.
399. Id. at 239.
400. Id.
401. 212 F.3d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 235 (2002).
402. 534 U.S. at 239. Justice Scalia did not participate in the decision.
403. Id. at 244-45.
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found that the barge was a workplace within the meaning of the
Act. 4
The Court found that the Coast Guard did not affirmatively
regulate the working conditions since the Coast Guard did not have
regulations pertaining to dangers from oil drilling operations on
uninspected barges in inland waters, the drilling operations that were
the working conditions at issue. With respect to this type of
uninspected vessel, the Coast Guard only regulated matters relating
to marine safety, such as fire extinguishers and emergency locating
equipment. The Court held that the Coast Guard had to regulate the
conditions that were the cause of the incident to preempt OSHA
jurisdiction.
The Court also found that the Coast Guard's regulations did not
affect occupational safety or health concerns faced by inland drilling
operations on uninspected vessels; thus, the regulations were not
comprehensive. The Coast Guard regulations with respect to
uninspected vessels were purely general marine safety regulations and
were insufficient to oust OSHA of jurisdiction.4 06
Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the barge was a workplace.
The Court held that although the barge was anchored in navigable
waters, the barge was still a workplace because it was located within
the State of Louisiana.40 7
While factually unique, and thus unlikely to have a broad impact,
the Court's decision in Mallard is significant in at least two ways.
First, as a result of this decision, courts and regulatory agencies
should narrowly interpret the provisions of section 4(b)(1) of the
OSHAct. That an agency issues regulatory standards pertaining to
portions of a particular workplace does not mean that the Court will
interpret this as an exercise of authority (for purposes of section
4(b)(1)) for all portions of that particular workplace. The agency
should ensure that its standards focus on the particular workplace it
wishes to regulate, as well as the particular conditions of that
workplace .408
Second, the Court in Mallard adopted a broad definition of what
404. Id. at 245.
405. Id. at 241-42.
406. Id. at 243-44.
407. Id. at 245.
408. Justice Stevens noted that although the Coast Guard addressed conditions pertaining to
certain classes of uninspected vessels did not mean that all OSHA regulations of all uninspected
vessels had been preempted. Id. at 244.
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constitutes a workplace under the OSHAct. Not too long ago, OSHA
faced major criticism regarding its attempt to assert authority over
home work.40 9 The Court's agreement with the agency's broad
definition of what constitutes a workplace may prove relevant if those
standards reemerge.
V. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT: USPS v. GREGORY
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States Postal
Service v. Gregory4 10 to consider whether, under the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA),411 the Merit Systems Protection (Board)
may independently review prior disciplinary actions subject to
ongoing grievance procedures in determining the reasonableness of a
penalty given in a subsequent disciplinary action.4 12
The CSRA allows eligible employees to appeal serious
disciplinary actions, such as termination, to the Board.413 The
respondent, Maria Gregory, a former letter technician for the United
States Postal Service,414 was a "preference eligible" employee covered
by the CSRA because she previously served in the Army.4 15
The Postal Service terminated the respondent in November of
4161997 after she deliberately overestimated her necessary overtime.
The Postal Service also based its decision to terminate Gregory on
three previous disciplinary violations that were still pending in
grievance proceedings pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
between Gregory's union and the Postal Service.417
Under the CSRA, Gregory could appeal her termination to the
Board, or seek injunctive relief through the grievance procedure that
was negotiated in the collective bargaining agreement, but she could
not do both.418 Gregory appealed to the Board.4 19 Under the CSRA,
an employing agency bears the burden of proving its charge by a
409. See OSHA Formulizes Policy Exempting Home Offices from Safety Inspections, LAB.
REL. WEEK (BNA), Mar. 2, 2000, at 249.
410. 534 U.S. 1 (2001).
411. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512-13 (2000).
412. Gregory, 534 U.S. at 12.
413. Id. at 5.
414. Id. at 5-6.
415. Id. at 7.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 6-7.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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preponderance of the evidence when the agency's disciplinary action
is challenged before the Board. 4 2 0 According to procedures used by
the Board for nineteen years, this requires proving "not only that the
misconduct actually occurred, but also that the penalty assessed was
reasonable in relation to it." 4 21 The Board Administrative Law Judge
upheld Gregory's termination, finding that she did overestimate her
overtime, and that the termination was reasonable in light of this
violation and her prior violations.4 22 The ALJ independently analyzed
the three prior disciplinary actions that were the subject of pending
grievances under the approach established in Bolling v. Department
of Air Force.4 23 Bolling requires de novo review of prior disciplinary
actions unless: "(1) [the employee] was informed of the action in
writing; (2) the action is a matter of record; and (3) [the employee]
was given the opportunity to dispute the charges to a higher level
than the authority that imposed the discipline."4 2 4 Because Gregory's
three prior disciplinary actions met those three criteria, Board review
was limited to determining whether the employing agency's action
was clearly erroneous. 4 25 The ALJ found no clear evidence of error in
upholding Gregory's termination.426 Gregory petitioned the Board for
review of this decision, and while this appeal was pending, an
arbitrator resolved one of Gregory's three prior grievances in
Gregory's favor.427 The Board refused to review the ALJ's
*  428determination.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that "prior disciplinary actions that are subject to ongoing
proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's
reasonableness." 4 29 Since Gregory still had two grievances pending,
the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's determination that the
penalty was reasonable.43 0
The Supreme Court held that the Board need not adopt the
Federal Circuit's rule to meet the minimum standards for review of
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 8.
423. 8 M.S.P.B. 658 (1981).





429. 212 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 534 U.S. 51 (2001).
430. Id. at 1299.
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agency disciplinary actions set forth in the CSRA. 43 1 Under the
CSRA, the Federal Circuit's review of the Board's decisions is limited
to determining whether they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; obtained
without procedures required by law, rule or regulation having been
followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence." 432 This standard,
the Court observed, is extremely narrow, allowing the Board wide
latitude in reviewing agency disciplinary actions. Thus, the Board
may consider past disciplinary actions against an employee even if
challenges to those actions are still pending in grievance
proceedings.4 33 The Court refrained from deciding whether the
Bolling test actually meets the statutory standard for review of prior
disciplinary actions that is required by the CSRA.434  The Court
merely stated, "If the Board's mechanism for reviewing prior
disciplinary actions is itself adequate, the review such an employee
receives is fair. 435
The Court reasoned that the Board has "wide latitude in
fulfilling its obligation to review agency disciplinary actions," and thus
the courts need only determine whether the Board met minimum
standards from the CSRA. 436 Further, the Board has consistently
independently reviewed prior disciplinary actions, so the Board's
decision to continue this practice was not arbitrary.437 The Court
noted that, the Federal Circuit's rule would delay the Board's
decision-making process or preclude agencies from relaying on an
employee's disciplinary history.438 In addition, the Court stated,
independent review by the Board was not contrary to any law,41 nor
did it violate the CSRA's preponderance of the evidence standard."o
The National Treasury Employees Union argued as amicus that
independent review of still pending prior disciplinary actions violated
the CSRA's statutory scheme which provided for review of discipline
431. Gregory, 534 U.S. at 10.
432. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000).
433. Gregory, 534 U.S. at 12. Federal Employees: Justices Allow Prior Acts Still Being
Grieved to be Considered in Review of Postal Firing, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 14, 2001, at
AA-1.
434. Gregory, 534 U.S. at 5.
435. Id. at 7.
436. Id. at 11.
437. Id at 12-13.
438. Id. at 13.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 14-15.
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before the Board or through a collectively bargained grievance
procedure.44 1 The Court responded that the "parallel structures of
review" found in the CSRA still allow the Board broad discretion, so
"the Board's authority to review the termination must also include
the authority to review each of the prior disciplinary actions to
establish the reasonableness of the penalty as a whole."4 4 2 Further,
the Court noted, even though independent review of pending
disciplinary actions may result in the Board reaching a different
conclusion than the arbitrator, or result in unresolved grievances,
such results are still fair because any employee who appeals still
receives an independent Board review.M3
The Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit.44 4
Because one of Gregory's disciplinary actions was overturned in
arbitration, and given that the Board had a policy not to rely upon
disciplinary actions that have been overturned in the grievance
procedure, the Court remanded to determine the effect of the
reversal on Gregory's termination.44 5
Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence, arguing that "the
Bolling framework provides federal employees with more than
adequate procedural safeguards." 4 6 First, he noted, the Bolling
framework for collateral review of prior disciplinary actions does not
conflict with any provision of the CSRA, because Congress did not
provide for any review of minor disciplinary actions. 7 Second,
Justice Thomas stated, the Bolling framework did not conflict with
the CSRA's preponderance of the evidence standard because "[a]t
most, the statute requires an agency to prove the existence of prior
disciplinary actions; it does not place the burden on the agency to
prove the facts underlying those actions." ' Finally, Justice Thomas
asserted, under the CSRA, the Board's review process and the
collectively bargained grievance procedures were separate
structures. 4 49 Therefore, "the Board need not wait for an employee's
pending grievances to be resolved before taking account of prior
441. Id. at 15.
442. Id. at 16.
443. Id. at 16-17.
444. Id. at 18.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
447. Id. at 20-21.
448. Id. at 23.
449. Id.
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disciplinary actions in its assessment of the reasonableness of a
penalty given in a subsequent disciplinary action."450
Justice Ginsburg concurred only in the judgment, agreeing that a
remand was in order for four reasons.451' First, the Board's reopening
regulation allows either the Board or the employee to reopen a case
at any time if a prior disciplinary action is reversed in a grievance
proceeding.452 Justice Ginsburg noted that "it might well be 'arbitrary
and capricious' in such a situation for the Board to disregard the
employee's revised record and refuse to reopen." 45 3 Second, Justice
Ginsburg asserted that Gregory could have pursued an alternative
arbitration forum.454 Justice Ginsburg stated, "Gregory, having at her
own option foregone arbitration proceedings, in which prior
discipline could not weigh against her while grievances were
underway, is not comfortably situated to complain that the procedure
she elected employed a different rule." 455 Third, Justice Ginsburg
agreed to remand because the Court reserved questioning the
adequacy of the Bolling review. 456 Finally, Justice Ginsburg agreed to
remand because of "the apparent, incorrect view of the Federal
Circuit that the Postal Service itself could not take account of prior
disciplinary action that is the subject of a pending grievance
proceeding. 457
The majority's decision may show a trend toward deference to
Board decisions as opposed to judicial intervention, so long as the
Board is reasonable and consistent in its judgments. The Court
stated, "[T]he Board has broad discretion in determining how to
review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal
Circuit's rule. "45 The Court further asserted, "The role of judicial
review is only to ascertain if the Board has met the minimum
standards set forth in the statute. "4' Finally, the Court noted that
statutory review of Board decisions is limited by an "extremely
narrow" arbitrary and capricious standard, 4 60 allowing the Board
450. Id. at 31 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
451. Id. at 25-31.
452. Id. at 26-27.
453. Id. at 29.
454. Id. at 30-31.
455. Id. at 31.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 5.
458. Id. at 11.
459. Id.
460. Id.
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"wide latitude in fulfilling its obligations to review agency disciplinary
actions." 46 1 In light of these comments, one would expect the Court to
show extreme deference to Board decisions under the CSRA.
Finally, the majority's decision may have interesting
ramifications in the area of procedural due process. Under Bolling,
the Board must engage in de novo review of prior disciplinary action
unless "the employee was informed in writing of the disciplinary
action, the action is on the record, and the employee had the
opportunity to dispute the charges to a higher level than the official
who imposed the discipline."46 2  If those procedural due process
requirements are met, then the Board will merely determine whether
463past agency disciplinary action was clearly erroneous.
The Court refrained from deciding the soundness of this
procedure,46 4 despite Justice Thomas' concurring opinion that Bolling
provided adequate procedural safeguards. 46 5 The Bolling procedure
may lead to an agency superficially meeting the three Bolling
requirements so that the agency action is merely subject to "clearly
erroneous" review. Such a situation runs the risk of giving too much
power to agency decisions, and not enough protection to employees
who may have been treated unfairly. Therefore, the Court may soon
address the soundness of the Board's Bolling procedure to resolve
any dispute about the required level of procedural due process.
Arguably, the Court's decision in Gregory complicates the
decision faced by federal employees facing disciplinary action.
Potentially, in the aftermath of Gregory, and in cases where there
might be grievances pending, employees will be less likely to appeal
terminations to the MSPB, opting instead for using the grievance
process. This is unlikely to happen, however. First, the MSPB's
appeal process is free, which might encourage employees and unions
to use it over the arbitration process. Second, the Supreme Court has
previously held that under the CSRA, arbitrators are required to use
the same interpretation as the MSPB in reviewing an agency's
disciplinary decision.
461. Id.
462. Bolling v. Dept. of Air Force, 8 M.S.P.B. 658, 660-61 (1981). Federal Employees:
Justices Allow Prior Acts Still Being Grieved to be Considered in Review of Postal Firing, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 14, 2001, at AA-1.
463. Bolling, 8 M.S.P.B. at 660.
464. Gregory, 534 U.S. at 17.
465. Id. at 20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
466. See Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
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VI. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: RA YGOR AND LAPIDES
Prior to 1990 federal courts applied a variety of methods to
address claim preclusion problems for plaintiffs seeking to bring both
federal and state law claims arising out of the same incident. 467
Plaintiffs included state claims in federal actions. If the federal court
dismissed the claims on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff was left
remediless if the statute of limitations on the state law claims expired
while they were pending in federal court. 4 68 In 1990 Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. §1367(d), which tolls the limitations period for state law
claims while a related action is pending in federal court.4 69 However,
in a 6-3 opinion, the Supreme Court held in Raygor v. Regents of
University of Minnesota470 that "§1367(d) does not toll the limitations
period for state law claims asserted against non-consenting state
defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds."471
The case stemmed from a lawsuit initiated by the petitioners,
Lance Raygor and James Goodchild, both former employees of the
University of Minnesota. They filed ADEA and several state law
claims against the University in federal court. The state law claims
were filed pursuant to the court's supplemental jurisdiction over
claims arising out of the "same transaction or occurrence" as claims
within federal jurisdiction. 4 72 The federal district court dismissed their
ADEA claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law
claims. The petitioners attempted to re-file the state law claims in
state court after the statute of limitations had expired. 4 73 The
University argued that petitioner's state law claims were barred for
two reasons: (1) the statute of limitations for the state claims had
467. See e.g., Notrica v. Bd. of Supervisors, 925 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1991) (district court
should give consideration to the expiration of statute of limitations in deciding whether to
dismiss supplemental claim); Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(refusing to dismiss supplemental claims unless defendant first agreed to waive the state statute
of limitations). See State Employees: Federal Rule Tolling Statute of Limitations Cannot Apply to
State Employer, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 28, 2002, at AA-1; Age Discrimination: Supreme
Court Considers Federal Rule Tolling Statute of Limitations, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 27,
2001 at AA-1.
468. See e.g., Notrica v. Bd. of Supervisors, 925 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1991); Bankshares, Inc. v.
Metzger, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See State Employees: Federal Rule Tolling Statute of
Limitations Cannot Apply to State Employer, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 28, 2002, at AA-1;
Age Discrimination: Supreme Court Considers Federal Rule Tolling Statute of Limitations,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 27,2001 at AA-1.
469. 28 U.S.C. §1367(d) (2000).
470. 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
471. Id. at 548.
472. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
473. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 537-38.
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ended, and (2) section 1367(b) did not apply to toll the limitations
period on the petitioner's state law claims while they were pending in
federal court because, under the Eleventh Amendment, the federal
court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's
ADEA claims.474
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that applying the tolling
statute to non-consenting states "is an impermissible denigration of
[respondent's] Eleventh Amendment immunity."47 5  The United
States Supreme Court also found the statute inapplicable, although
for different reasons.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority focused largely on
the federalism issues present in the case. Justice O'Connor stated,
" [A]llowing federal law to extend the time period in which a state
sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the
federal balance in an area that has been a historic power of the
states."4 76  When presented with an issue in a statute that raises
serious constitutional doubt, the Court believed that Congress has to
"make its intention to alter the constitutional balance between states
and federal government unmistakingly clear in the statute's
language."477
The majority relied upon two provisions in the statute as
evidence that the tolling provision could not be applied to the states.
The Court found that the statute did not expressly indicate that it
covered claims asserted against state defendants and did not expressly
provide that it applied to dismissal on Eleventh Amendment
immunity grounds. Thus, the Court concluded, Congress failed to
make clear its intent to alter the constitutional balance by applying
the tolling provision.478 Justice Stevens joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, in a dissenting opinion, wrote that section 1367(d) applies
even to non-consenting states because the goal of the statute is to
protect all of the plaintiff's state law claims.479
During oral argument several justices suggested methods that
would preserve a plaintiff's state law claims while the claims against a
474. Id. at 538. The Supreme Court held in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000), that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Id. at 75.
475. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 539 (quoting 620 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 2001), aff'd, 534 U.S. 533
(2002)).
476. Id. at 544.
477. Id. at 543.
478. Id. at 544-45.
479. Id. at 549-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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non-consenting state are pending in federal court. Justice Ginsburg
suggested that a plaintiff file a protective action in state court within
the statute of limitations, so that the state law claims may be
preserved while the action in federal court is pending.480 Justice Scalia
suggested that federal courts condition the dismissal of plaintiff's
lawsuit on the defendant's agreement to waive the statute of
limitations on the state law claim.4 8 '
This opinion may have great ramifications upon plaintiffs
asserting claims in the labor and employment law area. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens iterated that claims brought under
anti-discrimination statutes will most likely be filed in state courts
after this decision to avoid cost and confusion and to eliminate the
risk that a time bar will attach to a claim dismissed from federal court
on Eleventh Amendment grounds.482 The problem for plaintiffs in
actions against state governments is aggravated because at the time
the suit is filed the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue may not be
resolved. Over the last few years the Supreme Court has resolved the
Eleventh Amendment immunity issue with respect to the ADEA,483
the ADA,484 and the Fair and Labor Standards Act.485 However, the
immunity question with regard to other statutes, such as the FMLA ,486
and the Rehabilitation Act, has not been addressed by the Supreme
Court.
Raygor raises significant problems for litigants with claims
against state governments in federal court. Professor Chemerinsky,
for example, notes that after Raygor, "plaintiff counsel has only a few
options: take the chance that the federal court will not dismiss the
federal claims; if the federal claims are dismissed, hope that the
federal court will use its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the state
law claims; drop the federal court action and refile in state court; or
keep the action in federal court and simultaneously file state claims in
480. See Age Discrimination: Supreme Court Considers Federal Rule Tolling Statute of
Limitaions, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 27, 2001 at AA-1.
481. Id.
482. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 554 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). State courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over Title VII and ADEA claims. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1983).
483. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
484. Garrett v. Board of Trustees, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
485. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
486. Compare e.g. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that states
may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims under the FMLA) with Hibbs v. HMD
Dept. of Hum. Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding
that FMLA claims are not subject to state's Eleventh Amendment imnmunity).
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state court."4 7
In Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia,488
the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a state waives its
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by removing a
case from state court to federal court.489 This issue, however, was
limited to the context of state law claims where the state had already
waived its immunity in state proceedings.490 The issue was so limited
in this case because, although the plaintiff asserted both federal and
state law claims, his federal claim was invalid.491
In Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia State
University system sued the system's board of regents and university
officials, in their personal and official capacities, under the Georgia
Tort Claims Act and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.49 The professor alleged
defamation and violation of due process because university officials
placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files.493
The defendants removed the case to federal district court, and
then sought dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment.49 4 The district
court held that the state waived its immunity by removing the case
from state court to federal court. 4 95 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that Georgia state law was unclear about whether the
Georgia attorney general had the legal authority to waive the state's
immunity, so the appellate court allowed the state to assert its
* * 496immunity.
The Supreme Court held that a state waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by removing a suit from state court to federal
court.49 The Court asserted that, under its precedent, generally, "a
State's voluntary appearance in federal court amount[s] to a waiver of
its Eleventh Amendment immunity." 498 In the case at hand, the state
was involuntarily brought into the case. However, the state
487. Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Continues to Focus on Sovereign Immunity, TRIAL, Aug.
2002, at 66.
488. 122 S. Ct. 1640 (2002).
489. Id. at 1642.
490. Id. at 1641.
491. Id.




496. 251 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1540 (2002).
497. Lapides, 122 S. Ct. at 1642.
498. Id. at 1643.
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voluntarily invoked federal jurisdiction and, because of this
affirmative litigation conduct, the general rule applied such that the
state waived its immunity.499
The Court noted several reasons that removal did not fall outside
of this general rule. First, although recent cases, such as College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board," seem to require a clear indication by the state to waive its
immunity, affirmative litigation acts, such as removal, are sufficient to
waive immunity.' The Court focused on a policy to avoid
inconsistency and unfairness, such that a state is not to be given an
unfair advantage in litigation tactics."
Second, the Court found that a benign motive for removal does
not make a difference in whether the state waived immunity.503 Third,
while Georgia argued that state law did not give the attorney general
authority to waive the state's immunity, the Court asserted that the
attorney general voluntarily invoked federal jurisdiction, which was
sufficient to waive immunity.'0 The Court stated, "A rule of federal
law that finds waiver through a state attorney general's invocation of
federal court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness." 0o
Finally, the Court noted that its decision provided a clear rule for
states to follow to determine whether their conduct will be deemed to
be a waiver. " [R]emoval is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal
court's jurisdiction sufficient to waive the State's otherwise valid
objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal
forum."5 06
The holding in Lapides overruled Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury of Indiana,"' where a state regained Eleventh
Amendment immunity, even after the state lost in federal court, by
showing that its attorney general lacked authority to waive
immunity.o According to David J. Bederman, the attorney who
represented Lapides, "The decision tells states that they cannot use
499. Id. at 1644.
500. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
501. Lapides, 122 S. Ct. at 1644.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 1645.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 1646.
507. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
508. Lapides, 122 S. Ct. at 1646.
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the Eleventh Amendment as both a shield and a sword. They are
being told that they cannot use sovereign immunity in a cynical
way. 509
VII. LESSONS LEARNED? MAYBE
A. Lesson #1: Preeminence of Employment Law
Employment law cases amounted to a significant portion of the
Supreme Court's 2001-02 docket. Eighteen out of seventy-five cases
(24 percent) decided by the Court either directly involved
employment law statutes (e.g., Title VIII, ADA) or directly impact
employment law issues (e.g., FICA, Social Security Act). As the
number of cases the Court decides continues to decline, it is
astonishing that in the 2001-02 term employment law comprised so
much of the Court's docket.
B. Lesson #2: Unusual Allegiances - Strange Outcomes
One of the distinguishing features of this Court, whose
membership has been unchanged for about eight years, is its very
clearly delineated conservative/liberal lineup. In several areas, the
Court's lineup is fairly predictable with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, forming the conservative wing
of the Court; Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg on the
liberal side; and Justice O'Connor providing the "swing" vote, but
most of the time siding with the conservative block. This lineup has
held in areas such as federalism and First Amendment jurisprudence.
One surprising aspect of the employment law cases is that this
division does not hold too frequently. In only two of the eighteen
employment law cases discussed in this article did the "usual" lineup
of justices hold up: Rush Prudential and Great-West Life (the two
ERISA decisions dealing with issues of preemption). On the other
hand, there were eight unanimous decisions.
Justice Thomas sided with the liberal voting block of the Court in
all of the Title VII cases, which could be characterized as pro-plaintiff
in the sense that they make it easier for plaintiffs to meet procedural
509. State's Voluntary Removal to Federal Court Waives Jurisdiction Protection, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), May 14, 2002, at AA-1.
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requirements. The three ADA decisions issued by the Court also
included a somewhat unusual lineup of votes. All three ADA
decisions could be characterized as limiting the extent of the ADA.
Two of the decisions were unanimous, and in the other decision, two
of the regularly "liberal" justices (Justices Stevens and Breyer) sided
with three of the traditionally "conservative" justices (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy).
This somewhat unusual voting pattern is further evidenced if we
focus on the outcomes of the cases. One traditional way used to
identify trends in the Court's voting behavior is by classifying the
decisions as pro-employee or pro-employer. Clearly not all decisions
can be easily categorized in that way, as employees' interests are
pitted not directly against employers, but against an agency, or
insurance plan, for example. Yet, if we look at those cases where the
employer and employee interests were directly at odds, we observe
further evidence regarding the difficulty of labeling this Court as pro-
employee or pro-employer. There were eight cases that could be
classified as clearly pitting employee interests against the interests of
employers.so The Court was evenly split in this eights cases, four
being decided in favor of the employees, and four decided in favor of
the employers.
These observations suggest that the voting behavior of the
Rehnquist Court, at least during this last term, does not appear to
follow traditional "conservative/liberal" dimensions, or traditional
pro-employee/pro-employer lines. What legal issues then explain, or
appear to be motivating the Court? These are explored in the
following subsections.
C. Lesson #3: The Question of Deference to Administrative Agencies
A close look at the employment law cases decided this last term
reveals a certain degree of uneasiness in the Court regarding
deference to administrative agencies. It appears that the issue of
deference deeply divides the Court. The following examples illustrate
this point.
510. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, (2002); US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002);
Edelman v. Lynchbug College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002), National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, (2002); EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, (2002); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct.
1155 (2002).
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In Toyota, when discussing the meaning of disability, the Court
noted that the regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
should be considered "persuasive authority" since Congress drew the
ADA's definition of disability almost verbatim from the definition of
"handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act."' Regarding
the EEOC regulations, however, the Court said that their persuasive
authority was "less clear."512
Justice Souter appeared to respond to this statement, at least
partially, not in Toyota but in Echazabal. In Echazabal, the Court
upheld the EEOC's regulations allowing the employer to screen out a
worker with a disability for on the job risks to that worker's own
health or safety.' In the course of the opinion, Justice Souter
managed to endorse the EEOC's ADA regulations. In responding to
the plaintiff's argument challenging one of the reasons the EEOC had
advanced to justify its regulation, the Court commented on the role of
agency's regulation where there may be a conflict between two
statutes. The Court noted, "Courts would, of course, resolve the
tension if there were no agency action, but the EEOC's resolution
exemplifies the substantive choices that agencies are expected to
make when Congress leaves the intersection of competing objectives
both imprecisely marked but subject to the administrative leeway
found in [the ADA]."514
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.'" is also instructive in
this regard. While not disagreeing on the standard for evaluating the
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor in implementing the
FMLA, the decision shows a Court deeply divided on the
implementation of the deference standard. In framing the issue to be
considered by the Court, the majority refused to consider whether
Congress had spoken to the issue of FMLA notice. The Court
instead seized on the penalty aspect of the regulation arguing that the
regulation imposed a penalty contrary to the regulatory scheme
envisioned by Congress.' In choosing to focus on the penalty, as
opposed to the notice aspect of the case, the Court deprived the
Secretary of Labor of at least some degree of deference. As the
dissenting justices argued, had the Court started the analysis from the
511. Toyota, 122 S. Ct. at 689.
512. Id.
513. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2050 (2002).
514. Id. at 2052.
515. 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
516. Id. at 1164-65.
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notice aspect of the regulation the result might have been different."'
The FMLA clearly gave the Secretary of Labor the authority to
prescribe all regulations necessary to carry out the objectives of the
act. The regulations under dispute in Ragsdale could have been
understood as implementing that congressional mandate.
Arguably, the disagreement among the members of the Court
could be just a function of the application of the Chevron standard,
i.e., when and how a court should defer to administrative agencies. In
this sense the tension may be more apparent than real, and may be
entirely because different statutes involve differing degrees of
delegation of authority to agencies, and are likely to lead to different
results in the question of deference.
However, the Court's decision in one of the Social Security Act
cases, Barnhart v. Walton,"' raises some nagging concerns. In deciding
that the Social Administration Administration's denial of disability
insurance benefits was a proper interpretation of the statute, the
Court, as might have been expected, followed the Chevron standard.
However, toward the end of that section of the opinion the Court
stated: "In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal questions, the
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over
a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the
appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the
Agency interpretation here at issue.""'
This passage in Walton has been described as "little short of
astounding."5 20 The above quoted language could be interpreted as
creating a new step in the Chevron analysis, in which a court will have
to decide whether Chevron is the "appropriate legal lens" to be used
in reviewing the agency action. This threshold analysis, based, as the
Court suggests, in factors like interstitial nature, expertise,
importance and complexity, is a great concern to some commentators
since it "projects a loosely-cabined juggle of multiple and
indeterminate factors for determining in each case whether Chevron
governs."521
517. Id. at 1165-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
518. 122 S. Ct. 1265 (2002).
519. Id. at 1272.
520. See Robert Anthony, Keeping Chevron Pure, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 371 (2002).
521. Id. at 373.
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Viewed in light of Walton, the Court's discussion of the
deference issue in Edelman522 acquires some added meaning. In
holding the EEOC's relation-back regulation to be an unassailable
interpretation of Title VII, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter,
had the opportunity to discuss the question of deference to the
administrative agency. Before discussing the merits of the EEOC's
regulation, the Court labeled the deference issue "insignificant in this
case, '523 because the Court found the "EEOC rule not only a
reasonable one, but the position we would adopt even if there were
no formal rule and we were interpreting the statute from scratch.
Because we so clearly agree with the EEOC, there is no occasion to
defer and no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much."5 2 4
Although the Court ultimately agreed with the EEOC interpretation,
Justice Souter's opinion in Edelman might be interpreted as
suggesting that under some circumstances Chevron is not the
"appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the
Agency interpretation here at issue."5 25
It may be too early to say whether Walton is the first salvo in a
new battle over the issue of deference to agencies. One thing appears
clear, however, that there exist deep disagreements in the Court with
regard to the deference issue.
D. Lesson #4: Narrowing the ADA
It is very clear that the Court has settled on a very narrow
reading of the ADA. All three ADA cases, Toyota, Echazabal, and
US Airways, represent narrow interpretations of various statutory
terms. For example, in Toyota the Court narrowed the application of
the Act's protections by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to
prove substantial limitation in the major life activity of performance
of manual tasks. The Court made it clear that the ADA is only meant
to apply to people with severe mental or physical impairments. As a
result of this decision, it will be harder for plaintiffs to prove that they
522. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002).
523. Id. at 1150.
524. Id. Justices O'Connor and Scalia, while concurring in the judgment were quick to
respond to the majority opinion on this last point, however. Justice O'Connor began by
disagreeing that the "EEOC has adopted the most natural interpretation of Title VII's
provisions regarding the filing" of charges of discrimination. However, Justice O'Connor
deferred to the agency's interpretation "because the statute is at least somewhat ambiguous."
Id. at 1153-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
525. Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1272.
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are disabled under the ADA.5 26
Similarly, the impact of the decision in US Airways limits the
protections available to disabled individuals under the ADA. By
holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that an
accommodation that conflicts with seniority systems is unreasonable,
and that the plaintiff possesses the burden of proving the special
circumstances that make departure from seniority systems reasonable
while the employer merely must present evidence that a seniority
system exists, the Court placed seniority systems as an additional
hurdle that plaintiffs might have to address in their ADA
complaints.527
E. Lesson #5: Easing Procedural Requirements Under Title VII
While narrowing the reach of the ADA the Court, interestingly,
appeared to have expanded, primarily through procedural means, the
reach of Title VII. In Edelman, National Railroad, and Swierkiewicz,
the Court eased procedural and substantive hurdles faced by plaintiffs
in Title VII litigation.528 In Edelman and Swierkiewicz the Court
facilitated Title VII claims, by upholding the validity of an EEOC
regulation permitting an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after
the time for filing has expired, and by finding that an employment
discrimination complaint need not allege facts making out a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas but need contain only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,"52 9 which is the standard required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perhaps of more significance is the
Court's decision in National Railroad, in which the Court held that
Title VII precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or
retaliation that occur outside of the statutory filing period, but that
consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim
is appropriate even if some of the events fall outside the 180 or 300
day statutory period.
526. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
527. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
528. Edelman v. Lynchbug College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
529. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
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F. Lesson # 6: Waffle House - A Speed Bump or a Road Block?
Over the last several terms, the Court had sent a very strong
signal in favor of expanding the availability and enforceability of
employment agreements requiring the arbitration of employee
claims.s"o The Waffle House case represents somewhat of a move in
the opposite direction. In holding that "the EEOC has the authority
to pursue victim specific relief regardless of the forum that the
employer and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes,""' the
Court might have slowed down the stampede towards the adoption by
employers of employment arbitration agreements. Whether this
development turns out to be a significant hurdle or a minor speed
bump depends in part on how aggressive the EEOC takes on its role
of enforcing workers' rights under the various anti-discrimination
statutes.
G. Lesson #7: An Uncertain Future for the FMLA
The Ragsdale decision shows a Supreme Court concerned with
the possibility that the Department of Labor, through its regulatory
authority, will try to extend the substantive protections of the FMLA
beyond what the Court considers to have been Congress' intent. If
this is the case, we might observe a scenario similar to that reflected
in the Court's disposition of cases under the ADA. To the extent that
employers understand the significance of Ragsdale in this way, as it
appears they have,532 we are likely to see an increase in litigation, with
employers challenging several other DOL regulations regarding the
FMLA.
H. Lesson #8: Interesting Side Note
In what might turn out to be no more that a footnote to the 2001
term, an interesting exchange took place between Justice Ginsburg
and Justice Scalia in one of the Social Security cases. In Grisbrecht,
530. See Ann C. Hodges & Douglas D. Scherer, The Employment Law Decisions of the
October 2000 Term of the Supreme Court: A Review and Analysis, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 391, 415-16 (2001).
531. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 754, 760-61 (2002).
532. Consider the statement by Ann Elizabeth Reesman, General Counsel of the
management group Equal Employment Advisory Council, describing the ruling "as extremely
significant" since it eliminated what management groups thought was "the most egregious
extension" of the FMLA. Supreme Court Knocks Down DOL Rule Affecting Employers that
Fail to Give Notice, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 20, 2002, at AA-1.
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the Court upheld a provision in a federal statute that allows lawyers
to charge up to 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to their
Social Security disability clients.533 In his dissenting opinion Justice
Scalia noted that " [t]he fee agreements in these Social-Security cases
are hardly negotiated; they are akin to adherence contracts."'5 34 "It is
uncontested," continued Justice Scalia, "that the specialized Social
Security bar charges uniform contingent fess . . . which are presum-
ably presented to the typically unsophisticated client on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. "535
In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg did not miss this
opportunity. She noted that the very objection raised by Justice
Scalia, had been unsuccessfully leveled by the more liberal side of the
Court in recent cases where the Court had upheld the validity of
arbitration agreements. "Exposure to court review, plus the statute's
twenty-five percent limitation, however, provide checks absent from
arbitration adherence provisions this Court has upheld over the
objections that they are not 'freely negotiated.' 5 36
L Lesson #9: A Case that Wasn't
This term the Court took the unusual step of dismissing a case
after it had granted certiorari and after having heard oral argument,
on the basis that certiorari had been improperly granted. Adams v.
Florida Power Corp.17 raised the long debated question of whether
disparate impact claims are available under the ADEA. The Court
granted review in December 2001 and heard oral argument on March
20, 2002. Twelve days later the Court announced that it had
dismissed the case in a curt order saying only that "The writ of
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."5 38
Adams involved a challenge by a group of workers age 40 or
older to a series of reductions in force made by Florida Power. The
plaintiffs alleged that more than 70 percent of the workers selected
for discharge were age forty or older. By dismissing the case, the
Court let stand the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
533. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 122 S. Ct. 1817, 1820 (2002).
534. Id. at 1830 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
535. Id.
536. Id. at 1825-27.
537. 255 F.3d 1322 (11th. Cir. 2001), cert. dismissed, 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
538. 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
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Circuit, which found that disparate impact claims may not be brought
under the ADEA.
The Court's dismissal of this case might suggest either that the
Court is not sure how to deal with the substantive questions involved,
or that the Court is too divided to reach any kind of decision. In any
event, it is unlikely that the dismissal will be last word from the Court
regarding this issue.

